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Abstract
Relative Performance Evaluation, Analysts,
Convertible Debt
Jakob Infuehr, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019
Supervisor: Volker Laux
This dissertation addresses several research questions. First, I show that rel-
ative performance evaluation incentivizes more earnings management. The
optimal contract will depend less on a correlated benchmark, if it is easier
for the manager to misreport performance. Thus, the model predicts that
firms with strong internal controls and good auditors are more likely to use
RPE. Second, I show that a higher analyst following can lead to more or less
earnings management, depending on the skewness of the earnings distribution.
Analysts try to minimize their forecast error, while managers try to beat the
average forecast target. Thus, the actors’ actions influence each other. Third,
vii
I study the effects of accounting conservatism on the use of convertible debt.
In the model, firms use these financial contracts to separate themselves from
bad firms, while trying to minimize costs of financial distress. A very aggres-
sive accounting system helps good firms separate and avoid financial distress,
because this makes a low signal more informative and less likely, causing in-
vestors not to convert to equity after such a signal.
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Chapter 1
Relative Performance
Evaluation and Earnings
Management
1.1 Introduction
Incentivizing executives to work hard has been studied extensively in the lit-
erature. Holmstrom (1982) was one of the first to show that using the per-
formance of the competition in determining compensation can be desirable
if there are common shocks that influence output. Filtering this additional
noise gives a better understanding of the executive’s effort and reduces the
risk imposed on the worker. Positive covariance among firms’ performances
seems to be descriptive of the real world, where industry-wide and economy-
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wide events regularly affect multiple firms at once. Hence, one would expect
a widespread use of relative performance evaluation (RPE). Yet, empirical re-
search has found only modest use. Bannister and Newman (2003) and Gong,
Li, and Shin (2011) find that less than half of firms use RPE.1 A good example
of this is the oil industry. In 2007, at the height of oil prices, executives re-
ceived (compared to other industries) disproportionately high pay raises, four
times as high as the average (Herbst 2008). A similar correlation was observed
in 2015. When oil prices plummeted, so did the compensation of many ex-
ecutives. Median compensation fell, while it rose in other industries (Olsen
2016).
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) provide one potential explanation
for the lack of RPE. They find that ”better governed firms pay less for luck,”
and conclude that this is consistent with the hypothesis that CEOs have power
over their boards and essentially set their own pay. In contrast, I show that the
fact that weaker corporate governance is associated with less RPE use can also
occur in an optimal contracting setting, in which the manager has no power
over the compensation committee. An important feature in my model is that
the CEO can manipulate the performance measure on which her compensation
is based. I find that the optimal contract will make less use of RPE if the CEO
can more easily misreport the performance measure.
The intuition for this result is driven by a nonlinearity in the optimal
contract. Consistent with empirical evidence (Bannister and Newman 2003,
1A current working paper by Bizjak et al. (2018) shows that RPE use has increased to
48% in 2015.
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Garvey and Milbourn 2006), in my model the manager receives a large re-
ward for outperforming the benchmark, but her compensation only decreases
slightly for underperforming it. This causes two effects, both of which are
disadvantages of RPE.
First, the nonlinearity creates a difference in ex-post manipulation in-
centives. When the manager performs similar to the benchmark, ex-post in-
centives to manipulate will be higher, while they are lower when she underper-
forms the benchmark. If the manager’s performance were uncorrelated with
the benchmark, then these forces would offset, and ex-ante expected manip-
ulation would be unchanged. However, because the manager’s performance
and the benchmark are positively correlated, the chance that the manager
performs similar to the benchmark increases. Hence, she is more likely to be
in a scenario when she has high incentives to manipulate, and less likely to
be in a situation when she has low incentives to manipulate. Without RPE,
a contract could still be nonlinear. Yet, the lack of correlation due to the
absence of a benchmark means that the manager is not more likely to be in
a situation when her manipulation incentives are strong. Therefore, RPE in
expectation incentivizes a higher level of manipulation compared with a lack
of RPE use.
The second effect working against RPE is about the observability of
the benchmark. The manager has to commit to her effort decision early in
the year, well before the benchmark is realized. Ideally, she would prefer to
work hard when the benchmark is easier to beat, and shirk when it is harder.
3
However, she does not have to commit to an earnings management decision
until very late in the fiscal year, possibly even after the fiscal year already
ended. Real earnings management decisions such as accelerating next year’s
sales (by giving discounts) or delaying R&D spending by a month can be
made in December; and accrual-based earnings management can be executed
even in January, when many major (discretionary) accounting decisions have
to be made. At that point, she will have already observed the outcome of
shocks, such as changes in economic conditions, industry demand, etc. Thus,
the manager can condition the manipulation level on the realization of the
benchmark. With nonlinear RPE, her manipulation decision will depend on
her performance relative to the benchmark. This makes manipulation more
efficient for the agent, hence reducing the incentive effect to actually work
hard. Benchmark-independent pay does not have this disadvantage, because
the informational advantage is useless to the agent. Her manipulation decision
would be independent of economic conditions in that case.
The firm of course anticipates the two above described effects and proac-
tively responds by reducing the weight of relative compensation in the contract
structure. It trades off the benefit of using the more informative signal with
the benefit of reducing incentives to manipulate. This result can explain why
so few firms find it optimal to use RPE, despite the contrarian theoretical
prediction. The result also leads to the empirical prediction that RPE will
be used more in firms with better corporate governance, tighter accounting
standards, etc. that limit the CEO’s manipulation potential.2
2This empirical prediction can be tested differently than the one about powerful CEOs
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The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses re-
lated literature, section 1.3 describes the model, section 1.4 analyzes the sce-
nario without earnings management, section 1.5 discusses the main results and
also explores some comparative statics, and section 1.6 concludes. All proofs
are in appendix A.
1.2 Related Literature
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) has received some attention in the
academic literature. One of the earliest papers is Holmstrom (1982). He
showed that the optimal compensation scheme of an agent depends on his
performance alone if and only if his performance is independent from anyone
else’s. In the case of independence, no information about the agent’s actions
can be learned from comparing his output with another one. It would only add
noise and thus be detrimental in the case of risk-aversion because the additional
risk that is imposed on the agent has to be compensated. However, with
dependence, some information is embedded in the performance of others and
this can be used to more precisely incentivize effort. Under some conditions,
a weighted average of all performances and the agent’s output is a sufficient
statistic.
Holmstrom’s results did not specify how the weighted average should
capturing the pay-setting process. My prediction can use e.g. distance between firm head-
quarters and the auditor’s office (Choi et al. 2012, Kubick et al. 2017), while powerful
CEOs can be measured using CEO tenure, CEO-board duality, etc.
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be used in the compensation scheme. This is an important question that was
addressed in subsequent research. Banker and Datar (1989) find necessary
and sufficient conditions when a linear aggregation of signals is optimal. More
specifically, using profit is only optimal, when revenue and costs are equally
intense (sensitivity times precision) signals. Celentani and Loveira (2006) find
that ”if the marginal return of effort depends on the aggregate state, optimal
contracts are not monotonically decreasing in the performance benchmark”
and claim that this may explain the lack of RPE use in the business world.
Fleckinger (2012) generalizes these results by not imposing any restrictions on
the correlation of outcomes. His results predict that RPE is most effective
when covariance is constant and positive.
RPE has, of course, also been studied in the empirical literature. Early
papers (e.g. Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker 1992, Aggarwal and Samwick
1999) had to resort to indirect tests and did not find positive results. SEC rule
changes since then allowed the application of direct methods (e.g. Bannister
and Newman 2003, Gong et al. 2011) and results indicated that about a
quarter of all firms use RPE. Bannister and Newman (2003) also find, as well
as Garvey and Milbourn (2006), that firms use one-sided RPE, executives
get rewarded for outperforming the peer-group, but do not get punished for
underperformance. This result is consistent with the theoretical results of
Celentani and Loveira (2006) and Feriozzi (2011). I also find this in my setting,
although the reason is different. In my model, the assumption of limited
liability leads to one-sided RPE.
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Prior analytical research has proposed solutions for the relative perfor-
mance evaluation puzzle. Dye (1992) finds that the agent’s option to choose
among different projects can negatively affect RPE. Gopalan et al. (2010)
study a similar idea. The agent will pick a project (or industry) where his
skill is relatively high (compared to the peers in that industry), but may be
low in absolute terms. This is not in favor of the principal, who cares about
absolute profit, not relative one. Another paper is Dikolli et al. (2011), who
hypothesize that the empirical literature may have committed Type II errors
by summing peer-performance differently compared to boards (selecting more,
fewer or different peers). This could lead to a lower estimate on the number
of firms that use RPE in compensation contracts.3
The only published paper thus far to study the intersection of RPE
and earnings management is Bagnoli and Watts (2000). However, their paper
does not endogenize the agent’s compensation structure and therefore does not
examine the effect of earnings management on the use of RPE, key aspects of
my paper. There is also no moral hazard problem. A recent working paper
by Balakrishnan, Lin, and Sivaramakrishnan (2016) studies ranking systems
and its susceptibility to performance manipulation. This paper, though, is
more closely related to the tournament theory literature, rather than the RPE
literature.
3Other papers that discuss the RPE puzzle include Fershtman et al. (2003) and DeMarzo
and Kaniel (2017), who analyze agents’ utility functions that depend on others’ pay.
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1.3 Model
I consider a one-shot game with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral
agent.
Timing: There are two dates, t = {0, 1}. At date 0, the principal hires
an agent to be in charge of a project and offers her a compensation contract.
After signing the contract, the agent can exert costly effort that increases the
probability of success. At date 1, the outcome of a correlated benchmark is
publicly observed. The agent privately learns whether her project succeeded
or failed, R ∈ {S, F}.4 Then, she issues a potentially manipulated report.
Based on the report and the benchmark, the agent is paid and the game ends.
Effort: The agent makes a binary effort decision after being hired:
e ∈ {el, eh} (shirk or work). The probability of success, pe = Pr(R = S|e), is
strictly greater when e = eh is chosen, i.e., ph > pl. Effort imposes a disutility
on the agent, k(e), and without loss of generality, I assume that k(eh) = c and
k(el) = 0. Furthermore, to avoid trivial solutions, I assume that the principal
always wants to incentivize high effort.
Benchmark: There is an observable and contractible benchmark Z ∈
{G,B} (good or bad). The benchmark Z could be the S&P 500, which could
be low or high (in this binary model) or other quantitative indices of economic
conditions. Commodity prices are another option.5
4Unobservable outcome might occur, if the project is long-term, but the agent needs to
be compensated before the end of the project.
5A somewhat more endogenous choice would be the average performance of a peer group.
I address this interpretation in section 5.3. However, I deliberately do not use a two agent
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R\Z B G
F (1− pe + γ)(1− q) (1− pe − γ)q
S (pe − γ)(1− q) (pe + γ)q
Table 1.1: Joint Probabilities
The probability that the benchmark is good is q. A pair of results
can take four values, Y ∈ {SG, SB, FG, FB}. Let the probability of the
good benchmark be independent of the agent’s effort decision, Pr(Z = G|e) =
Pr(Z = G) = q. However, this does not imply that the probabilities of project
success and benchmark are independent. There is a positive covariance γ,
which alters the conditional success probabilities such that Pr(R = S|Z =
G) = pe + γ and Pr(R = S|Z = B) = pe− γ. Let γ be small enough such that
all probabilities are between zero and one. This leads to the joint probabilities
for the four possible outcomes displayed in table 1.1.
These probabilities capture, in the simplest form possible, the character
of positive correlation. The probability that the benchmark is good and the
agent successful increases. For example, when the economy is doing well, a
CEO’s projects are more likely to succeed. The assumption of a constant
covariance imposes a restriction on the model to keep the focus on the effects
of earnings management, and the exposition simple.6
Report: At date 1, the agent observes the outcome of her project and
the benchmark with certainty. She will then issue a report to the principal,
model. The situation I want to analyze focuses on a CEO, who does not have a comparable
coworker within the same company.
6The results are robust to alternative specifications.
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r ∈ {rS, rF}. Let the combination of the report and the observable benchmark
be denoted by y ∈ {ySG, ySB, yFG, yFB}. The agent can take an unobservable,
manipulative action m ∈ [0, 1] to issue a favorable report, even though the
project has failed. m is the probability that a failed project will be misreported
as a success, i.e. m = Pr(r = rS|R = F ). The agent would never misreport
good news because in the optimal contract compensation is higher when the
report is better. Generally, the manipulation level will take two different
values, mG and mB, depending on the benchmark, good and bad respectively.
The cost of manipulation is gm2/2, where g is an exogenous parameter
that captures how easily reports can be manipulated.7 For example, better
auditors, tighter accounting standards, and a vigilant board would cause g to
be higher. Furthermore, I assume that g > g ≡ 2c
ph−pl to guarantee an interior
solution, i.e. m < 1, in equilibrium.8
Contracting: The agent is risk-neutral and thus maximizing her ex-
pected wage, E[wy]. The only variable that is available for contracting, is the
combination of the report and the benchmark, y. Thus, the agent is offered a
contract w = {wSG, wSB, wFG, wFB} that specifies four state-dependent pay-
ments. For example, the agent receives wSB when she reports a success and
7One could assume that g depends on the realization of the benchmark. When conditions
are bad, auditors may expect more manipulation, thus auditing more. The results of the
paper are qualitatively unchanged, as long as the two different g’s are close to each other.
8These assumptions about the manager’s reporting have been used extensively in prior
literature with binary models and earnings management (e.g. Dutta and Gigler 2002, Jong-
jaroenkamol and Laux 2017).
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the benchmark is bad, y = ySB. The agent is protected by limited liability,
that is w ≥ 0 for each element of the vector. The reservation utility is set to
zero. The participation constraint will not bind in equilibrium, and first-best
cannot be achieved.
An incentive scheme exhibits RPE, when ∆w ≡ (wSB−wSG) > 0, joint
performance evaluation (JPE), when ∆w < 0, and independent performance
evaluation (IPE), when ∆w = 0. The greater the difference, the greater the
extent of RPE/JPE. wFG and wFB are not part of this definition because in
the optimal solution these payments are zero.
1.4 No Manipulation
The no-manipulation setting is a special case of the general model described
above, when g → ∞ and therefore m = 0. This case demonstrates the main
advantage of RPE.
The principal minimizes expected compensation cost
min
wSB ,wSG,wFG,wFB
E[wy] = (ph − γ)(1− q)wSB + (ph + γ)qwSG+
+ (1− ph − γ)qwFG + (1− ph + γ)(1− q)wFB, (1.1)
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subject to the agent’s incentive constraint
(ph − γ)(1− q)wSB + (ph + γ)qwSG + (1− ph − γ)qwFG+
+ (1− ph + γ)(1− q)wFB − c ≥ (pl + γ)qwSG + (pl − γ)(1− q)wSB+
+ (1− pl − γ)qwFG + (1− pl + γ)(1− q)wFB, (1.2)
and the limited liability constraint
wSG, wSB, wFG, wFB ≥ 0. (1.3)
Solving this problem leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1 When earnings management is not possible (g →∞),
then the optimal contract satisfies
wSB > wSG = wFG = wFB = 0. (1.4)
It is optimal to set wFG = wFB = 0, because any positive payment for
failure would only make it more difficult to provide incentives for the agent to
work hard. The reason for wSB > wSG is a little more subtle. Holmstrom’s
work (1979, 1982) shows that it is efficient to incentivize effort by linking pay
to the signal that is most informative about effort. If an agent is successful,
despite a low benchmark, then success is a very informative signal about the
agent’s effort. However, high agent performance in the presence of a good
benchmark is a less informative signal about effort. Formally, this can be
12
expressed with likelihood ratios:
Pr(y = ySB|e = eh)
Pr(y = ySB|e = el) >
Pr(y = ySG|e = eh)
Pr(y = ySG|e = el) or
(ph − γ)(1− q)
(pl − γ)(1− q) >
(ph + γ)q
(pl + γ)q
.
(1.5)
These likelihood ratios measure how strongly y = ySB and y = yySG,
respectively, signal that the agent chose high rather than low effort. A high
likelihood ratio speaks for high effort; a value of one would indicate that noth-
ing new is learned from the signal (Hart and Holmstrom 1987). The inequality
in (1.5) shows that y = ySB (agent is successful and benchmark is bad) is more
informative than y = ySG.
However, if one were to introduce risk-aversion, then there is a trade-off.
A large spread between wSB and wSG imposes a risk on the agent, which has
to be compensated in the form of a risk premium. The principal would have
to strike a balance between the risk premium and putting more weight on the
more informative signal. More risk-averse agents would be offered a contract
with less RPE, and agents that have a project with higher covariance would
be subject to more RPE (to filter out more correlated noise).
The results in the paper do not rely on risk aversion and the model
therefore assumes risk neutrality, to keep the intuition simple. However, all
results are robust to the assumption about the curvature of the agent’s utility
function. Imposing greater risk is a well-known problem associated with RPE.
The focus of the paper, though, is on another problem, and risk aversion is
thus ignored.
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1.5 Manipulation
Consider now the setting of main interest, in which earnings management is
possible, that is g <∞.
1.5.1 Exogenous Contract
I first analyze the manager’s optimal level of manipulation for any exoge-
nous contract which satisfies the incentive constraint with equality. I set
wFB = wFG = 0, as these payments do not incentivize high effort. Taking
the derivative of the agent’s utility function (A.13) with respect to mB and
mG, respectively, yields
mB =
wSB
g
and mG =
wSG
g
. (1.6)
Manipulation depends on the outcome of the benchmark, Z, because
the agent can observe Z before the manipulation decision. In contrast, effort
cannot be conditioned on Z because the manager only observes Z after the
effort decision.
The expected manipulation level E[m], in general terms, is
E[m] = (1− pe + γ)(1− q)mB + (1− pe − γ)qmG. (1.7)
For the expected manipulation level, the following proposition can be
obtained.
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Proposition 1.2 Expected manipulation level E[m] is always higher
for RPE (wSB > wSG) than for benchmark-independent compensation (wSB =
wSG). E[m] is minimized, when JPE is used. The minimal manipulation
inducing contract is characterized by an interior solution wSG > wSB > 0,
when earnings management is easy (g < gT ), and by the corner solution wSG >
wSB = 0, when g > gT .
9
Solving for the contract that satisfies the incentive constraint (A.16)
with equality, plugging all results into (1.7), taking the derivative of E[m]
with respect to wSB, and substituting wSG back in for simplicity, gives the
following result:10
dE[m]
dwSB
=
1
g
(1− ph + γ)(1− q)− 1
g
(1− ph − γ)g − wSB
g − wSG (1− q). (1.8)
The first summand in (1.8) is the direct effect of an increase in wSB on
mB. The manager will manipulate more when the benchmark is low (mB),
if the bonus payment he receives when he is successful and the benchmark is
low, wSB, is higher. The second summand in (1.8) is the indirect effect of an
accompanied decrease in wSG and hence mG. Several insights can be gained
from (1.8). First, when wSB > wSG (RPE), then the derivative in (1.8) is
positive, i.e. an increase in RPE always increases expected manipulation.
9gT is defined in the appendix, equation (A.20).
10Note that in a contract that satisfies the incentive constraint with equality, wSB and
wSG are negatively related. When one payment increases, the other can be lowered. Thus,
a change in wSB is always in the same direction as a change in ∆w ≡ (wSB − wSG).
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This result can be traced back to the positive correlation between the
manager’s performance and the benchmark, as well as the nonlinearity of the
contract. Nonlinear RPE creates incentives to manipulate more when the
benchmark is bad, because wSB − wFB > wSG − wFG. Manipulation allows
the manager to report that she outperformed the benchmark and collect a big
bonus. This scenario is more likely to occur when positive correlation is at play
because the agent is likely to perform similar to the benchmark. Additionally,
the optimal contract creates lower incentives to manipulate when the bench-
mark is good. Manipulation only allows the CEO to hide her underperfor-
mance relative to the benchmark, and avoid a small penalty (equivalently: re-
ceive a small bonus). This case is less likely to occur due to correlation because
the agent’s performance is less likely to deviate from the benchmark. Since
these forces flip when joint performance evaluation (JPE) is used, wSB < wSG,
expected manipulation is lower with JPE.
The fact that expected manipulation can have an interior minimum,
when manipulation is cheap, is driven by another key force in the model. That
force concerns the observability of the benchmark. If it is observable before
the manipulation decision, then the manipulation level, when the benchmark
is good, will differ from the level, when it is bad (as long as wSB 6= wSG).
If it were unobservable, then by construction the agent would have to choose
mB = mG. The loss of a degree of freedom for the agent means that she will
receive a lower utility to the benefit of the principal. He can pay out the larger
bonus less often because the agent is less efficient in her manipulation decision.
16
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1.3 If compensation depends on the benchmark (wSB 6=
wSG), then the agent’s utility is higher when she can observe the benchmark.
This result is a drawback for both RPE and JPE, and explains why
expected manipulation need not be monotonically decreasing as JPE usage
increases.
This second effect also is true due to the asymmetric contract induced
by limited liability. When the agent submits a low report, then compensation
is zero, no matter what. If compensation were symmetric, such that wSB −
wSG = wFB − wFG, then manipulation incentives would be independent of
the benchmark. This is an important point to emphasize. In a LEN model,
the linear restriction imposed on the contract makes it symmetric and thus
this effect would not be present. The asymmetric contract can arise in many
situations, depending for example on how effort affects covariance or limited
liability (as is the case in this paper), and is consistent with evidence from
archival studies (e.g. Bannister and Newman 2003).
1.5.2 Endogenous Contract
I now turn to the endogenous contract setting when manipulation is possible.
It is essentially the patterns described in Proposition 1.2 and Proposition 1.3
that lead to the following proposition describing the optimal contract.
Proposition 1.4 The optimal contract has the following characteris-
tics:
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(i) wSB > wSG = 0 (max RPE) when g ∈ [g∗,∞), 11
(ii) wSB > wSG > 0 (RPE) when g ∈ (ĝ, g∗),
(iii) wSG = wSB (IPE) when g = ĝ ≡ 8c3(ph−pl) ,
(iv) wSG > wSB > 0 (JPE) when g ∈ (g, ĝ),
(v) wSG − wSB → 0 (asymptotically IPE ) when g → g ≡ 2cph−pl .
The possibility of report manipulation creates a trade-off in the RPE
usage. On the one hand, RPE is beneficial due to the positive correlation (as
seen in the benchmark scenario). On the other hand, RPE incentivizes higher
manipulation. As a result, when the use of RPE indeed causes a significantly
higher manipulation level, then the principal will be more inclined to abstain
from benchmarking compensation. In fact, this effect can be high enough,
such that the principal actually prefers joint performance evaluation (JPE),
i.e. wSB < wSG, for some levels of g that are close enough to g. This means
that the agent actually earns a higher wage, when the competition was also
successful. The fact that the agent can observe the benchmark before her
manipulation decision is also a disadvantage for JPE and thus favors inde-
pendent compensation. However, the other key intuition that worked against
RPE, works in favor of JPE. The agent wants to report a success while the
benchmark is high. This outcome is more likely due to the positive corre-
lation, thus effort is more likely to achieve the desired result. On the other
hand, the lack of correlation for manipulation does not help it, and thus, it is
not as efficient in reaching the agent’s preferred outcome. Of course, JPE runs
11g∗ is defined in the appendix, equations (A.25) and (A.26).
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counter to using the most informative signal, but when the manager can easily
manipulate (g close to g), then its advantages can outweigh the drawbacks.
At g = ĝ, the forces balance exactly, and independent performance evaluation
is optimal.
Part (v) of Proposition 1.4 follows because the principal has to take ma-
nipulation into account, and a very uneven compensation structure incentivizes
heavy manipulation because the agent can wait and observe the outcome of
the benchmark. For example, for wSB > 0 and wSG = 0, she would manipu-
late heavily when the benchmark is low and not at all when the benchmark
is high. Given the convex manipulation cost function, the agent has to be
compensated for this manipulation (or else she shirks) with a very high payoff
that can be avoided by smoothing compensation across states. As a result, in
addition to the forces described in the previous section, RPE now has an ad-
ditional disadvantage when the agent can wait and observe the outcome of the
benchmark. The agent is now in a better position to efficiently exploit RPE
because she will not waste her manipulation effort when it is not as beneficial
to her.
Figure 1.1 illustrates an example of the above described observations.12
In the figure, g∗ ≈ 173. It is the point where wSG hits the x-axis.
For g ≥ g∗ (not pictured), when manipulation is very costly, the agent only
receives money if she reports success and the benchmark is low. The graph
shows the main relationship. As earnings management becomes less costly
12The example uses the parameters ph = 0.55, pl = 0.45, γ = 0.4, c = 2, and q = 0.55.
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Figure 1.1: Optimal Compensation
(moving from right to left on the graph), the firm has to reduce the importance
of the benchmark by decreasing the difference between the two wage payments
wSB and wSG. At the very left end of the chart (when g approaches g = 40),
incentivizing the agent to work hard becomes tough enough that both wage
payments have to increase to accomplish this feat. For g < g, no solution
exists. Threre is also a small range, g ∈ (40, 160
3
), where joint performance
evaluation is optimal, i.e. wSG > wSB. At g =
160
3
, the two wage payments
are identical.
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1.5.3 Comparative Statics
I now turn the analysis to some comparative statics. Less RPE is used when
either the range ”max RPE” in part (i) of Proposition 4 shrinks (i.e. g∗
increases) or the range ”RPE” in part (ii) of Proposition 4 gets smaller (i.e. ĝ
increases).
Corrolary 1.1 RPE is used less as
(i) covariance (γ) decreases,
(ii) probability of success (ph) decreases, and
(iii) cost of effort (c) increases.
A change in correlation has two effects. First, when correlation in-
creases, then this increases the advantage of RPE as seen in the proof of the
no manipulation scenario (see appendix). The likelihood ratios diverge and it
is increasingly easier to incentivize effort using RPE. Second, an increase in
correlation increases the difference in manipulation levels that RPE and in-
dependent compensation cause. While earnings management does not change
if benchmark-independent pay is used, it does with RPE. This is again owed
to the fact that an increase in correlation makes it harder to outperform the
competition by regular means, which is why the promised compensation has
to increase. This increased compensation in turn causes the increase in ma-
nipulation. However, the second effect is lower than the main effect on the
informativeness of the signal.
An increase in ph is beneficial for RPE because it alleviates the incentive
problem. The agent is more likely to succeed if he puts in the effort, and effort
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matters more because pl is kept constant, increasing (ph − pl). Thus, the
principal does not need to offer as much compensation which of course also
decreases the manipulation incentives. And as already established, a principal
that is less concerned about manipulation, will use RPE more heavily. The
effect of c can best be understood, when the ratio c
g
is viewed as the relative cost
of effort in relation to the cost of manipulation. Characteristics like optimal use
of RPE and equilibrium manipulation level are unaffected, as long as c
g
stays
constant. It is thus not surprising that an increase in c causes a proportional
increase in g∗.
Corollary 1.2 As manipulation becomes more difficult (g increases),
(i) expected manipulation goes down,
(ii) expected wage decreases,
(iii) the agent’s utility decreases.
Part (i) of the corollary can be explained as follows. When manipulation
is more costly to the agent, holding everything else equal, he will manipulate
less. A counteracting force here is the fact that with less manipulation, the
principal will use more RPE. However, this force is weaker than the first one. If
the principal would increase RPE too much and cause more, not less, manipu-
lation, then he would again suffer too much from the negative consequences of
RPE, and compensation would not be optimal. Hence, RPE will only increase
slowly and expected manipulation will decrease.
Part (ii) of the corollary follows because less manipulation makes it eas-
ier to incentivize effort. As noted above, the ratio c
g
is important as the agent
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always weighs her options to achieve the desired result. So when manipulation
is harder, the bonus necessary to induce effort declines.
Part (iii) follows because even though expected wage decreases, it is not
immediately obvious that this implies that the agent’s utility also decreases.
After all, manipulation decreases and consequently also the cost of manipula-
tion. Why is it not possible that the second effect outweighs the first one? It
is instructive to note that the agent can freely choose the manipulation level.
When g decreases, she has the option to maintain the original manipulation
levels, mB and mG. This implies that she could keep the manipulation cost
down while simply enjoying the increased wage. The only reason why the agent
increases manipulation, is because it increases her overall utility. There is no
reason why the agent would intentionally hurt herself and cause her utility to
decline.
1.5.4 A manipulated benchmark
Thus far I have assumed that the benchmark is completely exogenous. How-
ever, a reasonable argument can be made that executives at the other com-
panies can manage earnings as well. In this subsection I analyze how the
optimal contract and the agent’s behavior changes in response to a change in
q, the probability that the benchmark is good. While this does not endoge-
nize the benchmark completely, it is a reasonable approximation in situations
when each individual firm is only a small part of the peer-group. When that is
the case, each individual manager’s actions will have negligible effects on other
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firms’ decisions. A higher q can be a stand-in for other firms also manipulating
their earnings, thus causing the benchmark to be higher more frequently.
The most direct and obvious effect of an increase in q (when other firms
manipulate more) is that it becomes harder to outperform the benchmark.
The probability that the agent is successful while the benchmark is low de-
creases. This in turn requires an increased bonus, if one wants to use RPE, to
compensate for the decreased likelihood of achieving the bonus. That bigger
bonus, however, incentivizes more manipulation, and the board then uses less
RPE.
Corollary 1.3 RPE is used less (g∗ increases) as the probability of a
high benchmark, q, increases.
1.5.5 Renegotiation
One aspect that often receives some attention in the literature is renegotiation.
On the one hand, allowing for renegotiation undermines commitment. On the
other hand, it can also be used to incorporate new information into the contract
that was not available at the beginning.
To illustrate the former point, imagine that in the present model rene-
gotiation is possible after the agent has made her effort decision. If the agent
is risk-averse, then renegotiation can be mutually beneficial, because the agent
bears some risk that can be completely transferred to the principal. The agent
receives a flat wage, regardless of outcome. Unfortunately, this can and will
be anticipated by the agent. Realizing that, ultimately, compensation will be
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independent of outcome, and the agent has no incentive to work.
Illustrating the latter point is possible if renegotiation is possible after
the agent privately observes the outcome of her project. At first, it might
seem that the principal is in a bad spot to renegotiate because the agent has
an informational advantage about the project outcome. However, this does not
really matter because if the agent was successful, then she will not accept any
new contract that would reduce the pay that she is guaranteed to receive. After
failure, renegotiation can prevent earnings management because the agent will
receive a flat wage. This time, if the principal has all the bargaining power,
it does not affect ex-ante effort incentives. This is because expected ex-ante
utilities, depending on outcome, do not change. The agent is still interested in
achieving success because his pay will be higher in that case. However, because
earnings management will not occur, this can be anticipated by the principal
and will therefore affect the initial contract that is offered to the agent. The
contract that would be offered without renegotiation would still satisfy the
agent’s incentive constraint. The key difference is that the principal can save
the agent’s manipulation cost via renegotation. Hence, a contract that would
lead to more manipulation, if renegotation were not available, can be offered.
Thus, the optimal contract will feature a heavier reliance on RPE, since RPE
again would incentivize more earnings management.
Proposition 1.5 If renegotiation is possible after the agent observed
the outcome and the principal has all the bargaining power, then there exists
a new threshold g∗n such that the optimal contract sets wSB > 0 and wSG = 0
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if and only if g ≥ g∗n. The new threshold is lower than the old one, g∗n < g∗,
i.e. more RPE is used. Additionally, JPE is never optimal.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of earnings management on the profitability of
relative performance evaluation (RPE). When the manager cannot misreport,
using RRP is optimal because it filters industry-wide shocks and allows for
a more accurate measure of the CEO’s performance. High firm performance
when the competition failed is a more informative signal than good perfor-
mance when others succeeded, too. This insight would predict that RPE
should be widespread in the business world, given that positive correlations
are common. However, empirical research shows that this is not the case. I
show that one potential explanation for this can be earnings management.
Manipulation makes it easier for a manager to report success, while the com-
petitors fail. This is the case because manipulation success is less correlated
than real outcomes. Whether an auditor for company A demands an adjust-
ment will depend less on whether another auditor demanded an adjustment
for company B. Additionally, when the manager can observe the benchmark
before her earnings management decision, then RPE increases manipulation
incentives even further because the agent will manipulate more when it is
more advantageous to her. This gives the CEO an efficient way to boost her
expected compensation and thus makes it harder to incentivize hard work.
Ultimately, the firm will anticipate the manager’s incentives to ma-
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nipulate and will switch to a compensation scheme that depends less on the
competition in an effort to curb manipulation. Hence, the firm trades off the
benefit of using the most informative signal with the drawback of incentiviz-
ing manipulation. This result can explain why RPE is not as heavily used as
predicted. For some companies, the benefit of RPE will not be big enough
compared to its disadvantage.
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Chapter 2
Meet or beat analysts’ forecasts,
skewness, earnings management,
and investment choice
2.1 Introduction
Analysts, in their role as information intermediaries, affect firms directly and
indirectly in many ways. One of these is corporate governance. Yu (2008)
and Chen et al. (2015) have found that a higher analyst coverage improves
corporate governance, first and foremost by reducing earnings management.
This finding lends support to the monitoring hypothesis: analysts study fi-
nancial statements thoroughly, take part in conference calls with top level
executives, and increase attention due to the dissemination of information.
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Contrary to these results, there is recent research that finds negative conse-
quences of increased analyst coverage. He and Tian (2013) find that firms
with more analysts are less innovative, and Huang et al. (2017) show that
more analyst coverage can cause firms to meet the forecast target more of-
ten (which implies more, not less, manipulation). These results are taken as
support for the pressure theory, which claims that analysts create pressure
on managers to beat the forecast target. This theory is somewhat in conflict
with the monitoring theory. However, there is another channel that indirectly
affects manipulation decisions. Managers benefit from meeting or beating the
analyst forecast target (Bartov et al. 2002) and hence make discretionary ac-
counting choices to accomplish just that (e.g. Matsumoto 2002, Brown 2001).
In this paper, I show that the number of analysts following a firm affects this
channel. Hence, the observed empirical patterns can be explained, even when
there is no analyst monitoring or pressure at all.
Specifically, I consider a model in which managers will manipulate earn-
ings to just meet the average analyst forecast, if actual earnings are close
enough to the target. I call this the ”manipulation range” and it shows in a
histogram as a discontinuity gap. Analysts, on the other hand, try to mini-
mize the forecast error between their (individual) forecasts and reported earn-
ings (actual earnings are unobservable). Hence, managers are influenced by
analysts’ forecasts, and analysts are influenced by managers’ choice of manip-
ulation. I analyze two scenarios: when there are many analysts, and when
there is only one covering the firm.1 In the former case, each analyst takes the
1The intuition gained from these two extreme cases applies to intermediate situations as
29
anticipated reported earnings distribution as given, and tries to minimize his
or her forecast error accordingly. An equilibrium will form, when the analysts’
forecasts induce a reporting strategy by the manager, such that no analyst can
change his forecast without increasing the forecast error.
This equilibrium will change, if there is only one analyst issuing an earn-
ings forecast. Now, the lone analyst anticipates that a change in his forecast
also changes the reported earnings distribution. That creates an incentive to
decrease the forecast (compared to the equilibrium desribed above). If the
reported earnings distribution wouldn’t change, then a small decrease in the
forecast would not increase the forecast error by much (the first derivative of
the forecast error at the optimum is zero). Also, if actual earnings fall in a
range, where the manager would manipulate to the target either way, then
this also does not affect the error. The change in error will occur on the edges
of the manipulation range, especially the low end. When the manager would
not manipulate in the original equilibrium because earnings were a little too
far away from the target, he would manipulate now with the lowered target.
This decreases the forecast error for this specific earnings realization to zero.
On the high end, when actual earnings are just below or above the target, the
change is negligible, because either way the forecast error will be small. In
less technical words, the manipulation range is advantageous to the analyst
because it reduces his forecast error. By reducing the forecast, the manager
will manipulate slightly lower earnings that used to be farther away from the
well. The number of analysts ranges widely in the real world.
30
forecast target.
The effect of a lower forecast target on the average accounting manip-
ulation depends on the shape of the earnings distribution. When there are
many analysts, then the forecast that minimizes the squared error is the mean
of reported earnings (or median for absolute error, Gu and Wu 2003). When
there is only one analyst, a lower forecast causes more manipulation if the
earnings distribution (probability density function) at the mean is decreasing.
The manipulation range shifts left, and thus actual earnings are more likely
to fall into that range. This is the case when the earnings distribution is posi-
tively skewed as then the mode of the distribution is lower than the mean. The
reverse is true for a left-skewed distribution. Actual earnings are less likely
to fall into the manipulation range when the number of analysts covering the
firm decreases.
This result shows that analyst following can impact earnings manage-
ment, even when analysts do not monitor the firm, when earnings are skewed.
Earnings skewness is an overlooked attribute in prior studies (Yu 2008, Chen
et al. 2015) on this topic. Gu and Wu (2003) find that the median skewness is
about zero, but there is ”large cross-sectional variation in earnings skewness.”
Hence, it seems plausible that average skewness in other studies could be pos-
itive or negative, depending on the specific sample that is used. Therefore, I
propose that skewness should be a control variable in future research to clearly
identify the forces driving the relationship.
Managers can affect the reported earnings distribution not only by
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changing the reporting strategy, but also by changing the underlying actual
earnings distribution via investments. A key difference between the two is that
investment decisions are usually long-term, and thus have to be made well in
advance of analysts issuing their forecasts. Therefore, analysts will take the
investment decision as given, regardless of the number of analysts, and no dif-
fering equilibria emerge. The manager still cares about beating the average
forecast as often as possible. If the earnings distribution is symmetric, then
there is no incentive to deviate from first-best, because first-best gives the
manager a 50% chance to beat the forecast, which he cannot improve upon.
However, when the distribution is skewed, and if analysts forecast the median,
then a deviation from first-best is optimal for the executive. First-best invest-
ment will maximize the expected value, while the manager cares about the
median. If median and mean are different (due to skewness), then he has an
incentive to improve the median, even when this comes at the expense of a
decrease in the mean. Depending on his opportunity set, this could lead to a
preference for right-skewed earnings distributions.
The above result shows that it can be perfectly rational for a manager
to prefer a more right-skewed earnings distribution, as observed by Schneider
and Spalt (2016). They find that ”capital expenditure is increasing in the
expected skewness of segment returns.” However, they attribute this result to
the fact that managers use gut feel, which causes them to subjectively assess
probabilities, overweighting low probability events, as predicted by prospect
theory (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). Instead, I show that managers’ desire
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to beat the analyst forecast can be the driving force behind this observed
pattern.
Finally, I show that the interaction of investment and reporting deci-
sions incentivizes the manager to underinvest (i.e. reduce variance) in order
to improve the probability that earnings management allows him to beat the
target. Thus, for left-skewed distributions, the possibility of earnings manage-
ment can improve investment efficiency. The incentive to increase variance in
order to improve the median, and the incentive to decrease variance to improve
the efficiency of accounting manipulation can cancel each other out.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses re-
lated literature, section 2.3 describes the model, section 2.4 analyzes the sce-
nario when earnings management is possible, section 2.5 discusses the case
when the manager’s investment choice is endogenous, section 2.6 examines the
interaction between manipulation and investment, and section 2.7 concludes.
All proofs are in appendix B.
2.2 Related Literature
There are several streams of literature relevant for this paper. The first one
is the literatue dealing with managers’ incentives to meet or beat the analyst
forecast target. Brown (2001) finds that during the 1990s, median forecast
errors have shifted from small negative to small positive, indicating an in-
creased incentive to meet or beat the average forecast. Additionally, the share
of small positive surprises increased over time, and is more pronounced in
33
growth firms. Brown and Caylor (2005) confirm this trend, and further show
that since the mid-1990s the managerial tendency to avoid negative earnings
surprises is stronger than the one to avoid negative earnings or earnings de-
creases. They attribute this pattern to ”increased media coverage given to
analyst forecasts, more analyst following, more firms covered by analysts, and
temporal increases in both the accuracy and precision of analyst forecasts.”
Furthermore, Armstrong et al. (2017) find that the analysts’ external EPS
goal is more important to managers than internal incentive plan EPS goals.
Additional research tried to pinpoint the exact source of managerial in-
centives. Mutsunaga and Park (2001) examine the CEO’s annual discretionary
bonus (allocated from a bonus pool) and find that the bonus is negatively af-
fected if the consensus analyst forecast is not met for at least two quarters
of the year, while there is no significant effect for loss quarters. This reduc-
tion in bonus pay is in addition to the traditional linear pay-for-performance
sensitivity. Bartov et al. (2002) study the stock market’s reaction to barely
beating the analysts’ earnings expectations. They find that there exists a mar-
ket premium for beating expectations, even ”after controlling for the earnings
forecast error for that period.” This premium exists, even when beating ex-
pectations was probably achieved via earnings management. Furthermore, the
premium does not fade over a longer time window, indicating that ”investors
rationally react to the earnings surprises.” Finally, Matsumoto (2002) looks
at firm characteristics that are associated with an increased likelihood to beat
expectations. These include ”firms with higher transient institutional owner-
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ship, greater reliance on implicit claims with their stakeholders, and higher
value-relevance of earning.” These characteristics may by related to increased
incentives for managers to beat expectations. Similar to other studies, Mat-
sumoto finds that managers, in addition to accounting manipulation, guide
analysts’ expectations downward, to increase chances of beating these.
The second stream of literature is the analyst following literature. There
are of course many firm characteristics that determine analyst following (e.g.
Bhushan 1989: size, institutional ownership, return volatility, market return,
business complexity), but the one particularly related to this paper is about
earnings management. Previts et al. (1994) in their qualitative study find
that analysts are aware of ”adjustments of conservative, discretionary reserves,
allowances, and off-balance-sheet assets” and noted that analysts seemed to
like these adjustments. This observation is consistent with my theoretical
model, which finds that analysts benefit from earnings management due to
the reduction in forecast error.
More relevant than the determinants of analyst coverage, which are ex-
ogenous in my model, are studies about the effect of analyst following on firms.
Quite a few papers find positive effects of analyst coverage on firms, such as
market value (Chung and Jo 1996), less earnings management (Yu 2008), less
excess CEO compensation, and pay-for-performance sensitivity (Chen et al.
2015). All of these studies attribute these positive effects to the analyst mon-
itoring hypothesis, which states that analysts apply pressure on management
by increasing investor attention and disseminating information. On the other
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hand, there is recent research that finds negative consequences of increased
analyst coverage. He and Tian (2013) find that firms with more analysts are
less innovative, and Huang et al. (2017) show that more analyst coverage can
cause firms to meet the forecast target more often. These results are taken
as support for the pressure theory, which claims that analysts create pressure
on managers to beat the forecast target. This theory is somewhat in conflict
with the monitoring theory. Contrary to these theories, I posit and show an-
alytically that the effects can also possibly be explained without the need for
monitoring or pressure.
The final stream of literature is related to earnings distribution skew-
ness. Skewness causes mean and median to diverge, which is relevant when
making an assumption about analysts’ utility function. Gu and Wu (2003) and
Basu and Markov (2004) make the case that analysts minimize their absolute
forecast error, and hence forecast the median. Lastly, Schneider and Spalt
(2016) study the consequences of earnings skewness on investment decisions.
They find that CEOs overinvest, when earnings distributions are right-skewed,
consistent with the long-shot bias proposed by the prospect theory (Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979). In this paper, I show that this observed pattern
can be rationally explained by management’s desire to outperform earnings
expectations.
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2.3 Model
I consider a one-period game with three dates, a firm manager and one or
more analysts.
Timing: There are three dates, t = {−1, 0, 1}. At t = −1, the manager
invests k into a project that yields a return at t = 1. At t = 0, each analyst
simultaneously issues a forecast, predicting firm earnings. At t = 1, earnings
realize, but are not observable to anyone but the firm manager. Then, the
manager issues a potentially manipulated report, each player receives their
payoff, and the game ends.
Earnings and investment: At t = 1, unobservable earnings x are
realized. The probability density function is f(x), the cumulative distribution
function is F (x), the mean and variance depend on the investment, d
2E[x]
dk2
< 0,
there exists k = kFB, such that
dE[x]
dk
= 0, V ar[x] > 0 for all k, and dV ar[x]
dk
> 0
for all k. While the location and scale parameters of the distribution depend
on investment, the shape parameters (skewness, kurtosis) do not, they are
constant. For ease of exposition, I assume that the distribution is single-
peaked. The assumptions about the earnings distribution capture the notion
that any deviation from the optimal amount of risk, will decrease expected
earnings. Also, I will examine both observable and unobservable investment.
Manager and report: I assume that the manager’s only incentive is
to meet or beat the mean analyst earnings forecast z:
max
∫ ∞
z
g(y)dy, (2.1)
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where g(y) is the probability density function of reported earnings y as
defined below.
The manipulation results change slightly, if the median forecast matters,
and this will be addressed. The investment results are robust. If earnings x
are sufficiently close to the forecast z (0 < z − x < m) , then he will issue a
manipulated report y, and otherwise issue an unmanipulated report:
y =
 z if z −m ≤ x ≤ zx otherwise
 . (2.2)
Also, I will refer to [z −m, z] as the ”manipulation range” because the
manager will only manipulate if earnings fall within this range. The assump-
tions above capture, in the simplest form possible, the empirically observed
fact that managers have incentives to meet or beat the analysts’ forecast tar-
get. Figure 2.1 illustrates a possible example.
Analysts: The analysts know the earnings distribution, f(x). Each
analyst’s goal is to minimize the squared difference between his or her forecast
and reported earnings, i.e. min
z
E[(z − y)2]. They are all equally well-informed
and thus, in equilibrium, will all issue the same forecast z. These assumptions
warrant some discussion. The key characteristic of the utility function is that
the analyst suffers a loss that is increasing in the forecast error. Alternative
specifications are possible, such as minimizing the absolute error or maximiz-
ing expected reputation (if there were multiple analyst types). The results
for investment depend on this assumption, and will receive further discussion
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Figure 2.1: In this example, unmanipulated earnings x are distributed in the
form of a Gamma distribution: f(x) ∼ Γ(2, 1). The forecast is z = 2.05.
The manipulation range width is m = 0.5. Thus, the manipulation range is
[1.55, 2.05]. For these values, the mean of reported earnings will be equal to
the forecast, an equilibrium, when there are many analysts.
below. Additionally, there is no forecast dispersion in this model, because all
analysts are equally well informed. This assumption simplifies the exposition,
but does not affect any inferences.
2.4 Earnings management
In this section, I assume that investment is exogenously given, and normalize
E[x] = 0. Thus, the complete focus of this section is on the effects of earnings
management. Furthermore, for mathematical convenience, I assume that m is
small compared to V ar[x], i.e. m
V ar[x]
→ 0.
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2.4.1 Many Analysts
In this subsection, I assume that there are infinitely many analysts. Each
analyst’s effect on the average forecast target is negligible. As a result, every
analyst takes the manager’s reporting strategy as given. The analysts minimize
their squared error, which means that their forecast has to be the expected
value of the reported earnings distribution:
z = E[y] =
∫ z−m
−∞
xf(x)dx+ z(F (z)− F (z −m)) +
∫ ∞
z
xf(x)dx. (2.3)
The first and last summands are the unmanipulated reports, when earn-
ings are either too far away from the target or higher than the target and no
manipulation is necessary. The middle term represents reported earnings when
actual earnings are just a hair below the average forecast. In that instance,
the manager would manipulate the report to meet the forecast. Since reported
earnings are higher than actual unobservable earnings by the amount of ma-
nipulation, the above equation can also be written as:
z = E[y] = E[x]︸︷︷︸
=0
+
∫ z
z−m
(z − x)f(x)dx. (2.4)
Thus, equation (2.4) shows expected manipulation, when there are
many analysts. Note that they are evaluated based on the difference between
their forecast and reported earnings. Analysts have to anticipate the manager’s
expected amount of manipulation and adjust their forecasts upward accord-
ingly, otherwise their forecasts would be too low. In equilibrium, the mean
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of the reported earnings distribution influenced by the analysts’ forecasts has
to match the analysts’ mean forecast. Only then will analysts not have any
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy. I do not need to solve for
z explicitly, since I am not interested in the location of z, but how z changes
as the number of analysts changes.
2.4.2 One Analyst
I now analyze the situation, when there is only one analyst. The analyst will
take the effect of his report on the reporting strategy of the manager into
account, and due to this indirect effect, the forecast will deviate from the
expected value of reported earnings. The analyst’s objective is as follows:
min
z
E[(z − y)2]. (2.5)
Since I only need to find out whether the forecast will be lower or
higher than the one in the last section, it is sufficient to analyze the change
in squared error at the expected value. At that value, the direct effect will
be zero, because the derivative at an optimum is zero. Small deviations from
an optimum do not matter much. Therefore, it will be the indirect effect
via the change in the manager’s reporting strategy that determines the new
equilibrium. Let the ”many analysts equilibrium forecast” be zm and the ”one
analyst equilibrium forecast” be zo. Assume that zo < zm (to be verified later).
Then there are two ranges, where the reporting strategy changes: at the lower
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end of the manipulation range [zo −m, zm −m] and at the higher end of the
manipulation range [zo, zm]. Figure 2.2 illustrates this.
Figure 2.2: This is the same distribution as in Figure 2.1: f(x) ∼ Γ(2, 1).
When there are few analysts, they will lower the forecast. The two important
changes to the manager’s reporting strategy occur at the lower end of the
manipulation range (region with red stripes) and at the higher end (region
with green stripes). Changes in forecast error for the regions below the red
striped one and above the green striped ones balance each other. Between the
red and green region, the forecast error will be zero.
Thus, we can obtain the following formula for the change in squared
error:
E[(zo − y)2]−E[(zm − y)2] =
∫ zm
zo
(x− zo)2f(x)dx−
∫ zm−m
zo−m
(zm − x)2f(x)dx.
(2.6)
The first summand is the increase in error at the high end of the ma-
nipulation range. Originally, there was no error because the manager would
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manipulate to the target. With the lowered forecast, he no longer has to ma-
nipulate when earnings fall into this range, and there will be a positive error.
The second summand is the decrease in error at the low end of the manipula-
tion range. With the lowered target, the manager will now manipulate to the
target and the error is zero. Originally, earnings were too low at this point
and the manager did not manipulate, leading to a positive error. One can
see that the error in the first term will be close to zero because with a lower
target, reported earnings are only a smidgen above the forecast. However, the
error in the second term is positive because it is at least m. Formally, using a
first-order approximation approach shows that the first term approaches zero,
while the second term is nonzero. Thus, the squared error is decreasing at zm,
proving that zo < zm is correct, which is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 The fewer analysts follow a firm, whose forecasts are used
as a target for the manager, the lower the forecast will be.
Intuitively, the manipulation range is beneficial to the analysts, because
it eliminates the forecast error compeletely. If actual earnings fall into this
range, then the manager manipulates to the forecast, and the error is zero. The
analyst, if there are not too many following the same firm, can influence the
manager’s reporting strategy and hence the location of the manipulation range.
Naturally, he would like to eliminate bigger, rather than smaller, forecast
errors. Essentially, the analyst lowers his forecast to allow the manager to
manipulate to the target for lower earnings realizations than before.
It should be noted that if the analysts believe that the manager’s target
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is the median forecast, then there will be no change in equilibrium, when
there are three or more analysts. This is because no single analyst can change
the median by changing his forecast, when there are at least three analysts.
Although, if one were to introduce forecast dispersion into the model, then
each analyst, ex-ante, would have a 1
N
chance (N is number of analysts) of
issuing the median forecast. Thus, each analyst would anticipate that a change
in his forecast would matter in expectation by 1
N
of that change, and results
would be the same as when the manager’s target is the mean forecast.
Now we can go back to equation (2.4) and evaluate how manipulation
changes when the forecast decreases. The width of the manipulation range
(m) and the amount of manipulation (z − x) are unchanged. However, the
probability that manipulation occurs will be different. If the mean of the earn-
ings distribution is on the downward sloping part (mean higher than mode),
then a forecast decrease will increase the probability of manipulation. Vice
versa, if the mean is on the upward sloping part of the distribution, then a
forecast decrease will decrease the probability of manipulation. The mean of a
distribution is higher than the mode, if it is right-skewed (or positively skewed)
using the Pearson mode skewness. Formally, we can see the above intuition
taking a derivate of equation (2.4) and applying the Leibniz rule:
d
dz
(
∫ z
z−m
(z − x)f(x)dx) = F (z)− F (z −m)−mf(z −m). (2.7)
The remainder of the proof again uses first-order approximation. Thus,
we can state the above result in the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.1 A lower analyst following leads to more expected
manipulation if the earnings distribution is right-skewed and vice versa.
The above result shows that the number of analysts covering a firm can
influence that firm’s manager’s earnings management decisions, even when
there is no monitoring occuring. Prior archival studies (Yu 2008, Chen et al.
2015) on this topic have attributed the relationship to the monitoring hypoth-
esis without accounting for potential effects of skewness. Gu and Wu (2003)
find that the median skewness is about zero, but there is ”large cross-sectional
variation in earnings skewness.” Hence, it seems plausible that average skew-
ness in other studies could be positive or negative, depending on the specific
sample that is used. Therefore, I propose that skewness should be a control
variable in future research to clearly identify the forces driving the relationship.
In the model, analysts are completely rational. Yet, from an outsider’s
perspective, it can appear as if a lone analyst does not minimize the forecast
error, if one mistakenly assumes the manager’s reporting strategy is constant.
Archival researchers can observe that expected value (or median for that mat-
ter) of reported earnings and analyst forecast do not match when there are few
analysts (Brown 1997, Lim 2001, Hong and Kacperczyk 2010). However, this
bias is not real and perfectly reasonable from the analyst’s point of view. The
analyst not only minimizes the error given the distribution, but also takes the
indirect effect, by changing the manager’s manipulation strategy, into account.
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2.4.3 Comparative Statics
The model allows for more insights to be gained about the effect of analyst
coverage on accounting manipulation.
Corollary 2.1 An increase in variance of the earnings distribution leads
to
(i) less expected manipulation,
(ii) a decreased impact of a change in analyst following on manipulation.
The first one follows from the fact that an increase in variance makes
it less likely that actual earnings fall just below the forecast target. Most of
the time, earnings will either be high enough such that manipulation is not
necessary, or low enough such that too much manipulation would be required
(more than the manager is comfortable with). Intuition for (ii) is as fol-
lows: Since manipulation is less likely to occur, analysts will be less concerned
about a change in their forecasts affecting the manager’s reporting strategy.
This effect causes forecasts to increase and approach the ”many analysts equi-
librium”. Another effect happens, if analysts forecast the median, because
a mean-preserving spread changes the median, as long as the distribution is
skewed. For example, for a right-skewed distribution, an increase in variance
leads to a decrease in the median (see Figure 2.3).
Corollary 2.2 When the earnings distribution becomes more skewed
(deviates more from zero skewness), then a change in analyst following causes
a larger change in earnings management.
The intuition here stems from the fact that there is no effect of a change
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Figure 2.3: The black line is the same probability density function as in the
previous figures: f(x) ∼ Γ(2, 1). the grey line is f(x + 0.5) ∼ Γ(2, 0.75). For
both distributions, E[x] = 2. However, the median of the grey distribution
with less variance (1.76) is higher than the median of the black distribution
(1.68), illustrating the manager’s incentives to decrease variance, when the
distribution is right-skewed.
in analyst following on manipulation, if the distribution is not skewed at all.
There will still be an effect on the average forecast, but a change in the forecast
does not lead to a change in expected manipulation because the probability
density function is flat around the mean (and median). As skewness deviates
more from zero, this does not persist and the probability of manipulation
changes with a change in the forecast (i.e. the first derivative of the probability
density function is nonzero).
Corollary 2.3 An increase in the manipulation range m causes an
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increase in analysts’ forecasts.
Analysts try to forecast reported earnings, not actual earnings. If ma-
nipulation is easier for the firm manager, then expected reported earnings
increase, and so should the analysts’ forecasts, i.e. dz
dm
> 0. On the other
hand, it is also instructive to analyze, whether forecasts will increase by more
than the increase in m. Clearly, this cannot be optimal for the analysts. Ma-
nipulation is not guaranteed to occur, so reported earnings increase by less
than the increase in m. Thus, combining these observations, it has to be true
that 0 < dz
dm
< 1.
2.4.4 Discussion of Results
The above result shows that the number of analysts covering a firm can influ-
ence that firm’s manager’s earnings management decisions, even when there is
no monitoring or pressure occuring. Prior archival studies on this topic have
attributed the relationship to the monitoring hypothesis (Yu 2008, Chen et al.
2015) or the pressure hypothesis (He and Tian 2013, Huang et al. 2017) with-
out accounting for potential effects of skewness. Gu and Wu (2003) find that
the median skewness is about zero, but there is ”large cross-sectional varia-
tion in earnings skewness.” Hence, it seems plausible that average skewness in
other studies could be positive or negative, depending on the specific sample
that is used.
Gu and Wu (2003) also show that there is a positive correlation be-
tween firm size and skewness, which means that large firms are more likely
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to have a right-skewed distribution. This leads to the prediction that samples
that are more heavily weighted towards large firms, would lead researchers to
proclaim consistency with the monitoring hypothesis, while samples with a
larger proportion of smaller firms would lead to researchers finding support
for the pressure hypothesis. Yu (2008) only reports market value and Huang
et al. (2017) only report the logarithm of market value. Log mean and mean
log are not equivalent transformations. Thus, I am not able to compare the
average firm size of these two papers. However, both Chen et al. (2015) and
He and Tian (2013) report total assets. Indeed, the average firm size in the
former paper is significantly bigger than in the latter,2 consistent with my
prediction. Therefore, I propose that skewness should be a control variable in
future research to clearly identify the forces driving the relationship.
Additionally, Gu and Wu (2003) demonstrate a negative correlation
between skewness and loss firms. This is logical because a loss is more likely
to occur when the earnings distribution exhibits a long left tail. Hence, I would
expect these firms to have a positive correlation between analyst following and
earnings management (what archival researchers would label as consistent with
the pressure hypothesis).
Finally, in the model, analysts are completely rational. Yet, from an
outsider’s perspective, it can appear as if a lone analyst does not minimize
the forecast error, if one mistakenly assumes the manager’s reporting strategy
is constant. Archival researchers can observe that expected value (or median
2Chen et al. (2015) report mean total assets of $10 billion and a median of $2 billion.
He and Tian (2013) report mean total assets of $3.6 billion and a median of $0.4 billion.
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for that matter) of reported earnings and analyst forecast do not match when
there are few analysts (Brown 1997, Lim 2001, Hong and Kacperczyk 2010).
However, this bias is not real and perfectly reasonable from the analyst’s point
of view. The analyst not only minimizes the error given the distribution, but
also takes the indirect effect, by changing the manager’s manipulation strategy,
into account.
2.5 Investment
In this section, I assume that earnings management is not possible, i.e. m =
0. On the other hand, the manager will now choose the investment level k
endogenously. Thus, the complete focus of this section is on the effect of
forecast beating on investment choice.
There are several relevant factors that affect the equilibrium investment
level, neither of which is the number of analysts. In an equilibrium, neither the
manager nor the analysts can have an incentive to deviate from their strategies.
However, the key difference to the earnings management case above is that
the manager makes the investment decision before the analysts decide on their
forecast. Thus, regardless of the number of analysts, they will always take the
investment level as given. This can be stated in the following observation.
Observation 2.1 The number of analysts does not affect the equilib-
rium investment level.
The three factors that are relevant include the analysts’ loss function,
earnings skewness, and investment observability. If analysts minimize the
50
squared forecast error, then they will forecast the mean. If they minimize
the absolute error, then they will forecast the median. Combined, these three
factors produce the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 If shape parameters are held constant, then the fol-
lowing statements are valid.
(i) If investment is observable, then investment will be first-best.
(ii) If investment is unobservable, and analysts minimize the squared
error, then investment will be first-best.
(iii) If earnings are skewed, investment is unobservable, and analysts
minimize the absolute error, then there will be underinvestment, if earnings
are right-skewed, and overinvestment, if earnings are left-skewed.
The manager wants to maximize the probability of beating the forecast
target. If earnings are not skewed, then he will beat the forecast exactly 50%
of the time if he chooses first-best investment. Since he has no way of im-
proving this probability, even off the equilibrium path, he has no incentive to
deviate from first-best without earnings skewness. Part (i) follows a similar
logic. Regardless of his choice, he will always beat the forecast a fixed per-
centage of the time. Due to observability, analysts adapt their forecasts such
that the median/mean equals the forecast. Due to the assumption of constant
shape parameters, the percentile of the mean is constant, and hence the man-
ager’s chances of outperforming the mean are as well. Counterintuitively, the
manager does have an incentive to deviate from first-best, when investment is
unobservable (part iii), when analysts forecast the median. In equilibrium, he
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will still beat the forecast target only 50% of the time. However, the allure
of a higher success rate off the equilibrium path incentivizes him to deviate
from first-best. At the first-best investment level, the mean of the earnings
distribution will not change much when investment changes (the first deriva-
tive is zero). Yet, the median does change because variance changes. The
difference between mean and median is proportional to the standard deviation
of a distribution when shape parameters are held constant. The manager has
an incentive to increase the median, because he takes the analysts’ forecasts as
given, who cannot adapt to changes in the manager’s decision due to unobserv-
ability. When the distribution is left-skewed, then the median is higher than
the mean. Hence, the manager wants to increase variance by overinvesting,
which causes the median to increase and diverge from the mean. The reverse
is true for a right-skewed distribution (part iii). Figure 2.3 shows the desribed
behavior.
This effect is also known as the Red Queen effect (from Alice in Won-
derland). The manager deviates from first-best, even though in equilibrium,
he will still not have achieved anything. The analysts perfectly anticipate this
deviation. The intuition for unobservable investment changes, when analysts
forecast the mean (part ii). With constant shape parameters, the manager can-
not influence the percentile ranking of the mean. The only way of increasing
his probability of success would be to increase the mean itself. This, however,
will cause him to make the first-best investment decision.
So far, I kept the shape parameters constant and only allowed the man-
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ager to affect location and scale parameters. Realisticallly, a CEO will also
have control over skewness itself. He could decide to invest in a long-shot
project that succeeds only a small percentage of times (but pays off big when
it does) or opt for a more balanced approach with equal likelihood of devia-
tions from the mean. Take the following example: let earnings be distributed
in the form of a demeaned Gamma distribution, with an extra term such that
first-best is achieved at α = αFB = 2:
x ∼ Γ(α, 1)− α− (2− α)2. (2.8)
a is the shape parameter of the Gamma distribution and skewness is
2√
α
. If the manager can choose α, then it is easy to show that he will choose
α < αFB, if analysts minimize the absolute error and investment is unobserv-
able. A lower α implies a more positive skewness. Hence, the manager, given
this opportunity set, has a long-shot bias. The bias, however, is not caused by
the direct effect on skewness, but via an indirect effect on variance. One can-
not change skewness of a Gamma distribution without also affecting variance.
An increase in skewness causes a decrease in variance. The above described
intuition that the manager prefers less variance when the distribution is right-
skewed still applies, and thus results in a preference for more skewness. This
intuition can be stated in the following observation.
Observation 2.2 If analysts minimize the absolute error and invest-
ment is unobservable, then depending on the opportunity set of the manager,
he may exhibit a long-shot bias.
53
The manager’s desire to beat the analysts’ forecast can rationally ex-
plain the long-shot bias. Schneider and Spalt (2016) find that ”capital ex-
penditure is increasing in the expected skewness of segment returns.” They
attribute this result to the fact that managers use gut feel, which causes them
to subjectively assess probabilities, overweighting low probability events, as
predicted by prospect theory (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979).
2.6 Manipulation and Investment
Finally, I turn to the full model (as described in the model section) with an
endogenous investment level k and a positive manipulation range width m > 0.
The above observed forces of the previous two sections are of course still at
play in the full model. Hence, this section will focus on the effects that the
interaction between investment and earnings management causes.
The model can be solved backwards. When the manager makes the
manipulation decision, he takes his own investment decision and the analysts’
forecasts as given. When the analysts decide on their forecasts, they take
the manager’s investment decision as given. Hence, this part of the model
is equal to the analysis of section 4. However, when the manager makes his
investment decision, he will take the subsequent effects on analyst forecasts
and earnings management into account. As it turns out, the interaction of
investment and manipulation creates an incentive for the manager to decrease
investment. Less investment is associated (by assumption) with less variance.
Less earnings dispersion makes manipulation more effective because income
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will fall into the manipulation range more often, as the width of the range
is exogenously fixed. The manager will not minimize variance completely,
though. If investment is unobservable, then there is still an incentive to keep
variance above the minimum, because this will positively affect median (and
mean) earnings, allowing him to beat the target more often (off the equilib-
rium path, analysts of course anticipate this behavior in equilibrium). With
observable investment, he would indeed minimize variance. This can easily
be fixed, if one assumes that the executive not just cares about beating the
forecast (as is done in this paper for simplicity), but also about firm value.
The above described intuition can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3 The interaction between earnings management and
investment causes the CEO to choose less investment and leads to more ex-
pected earnings management.
While Proposition 2.3 discusses the interaction effect, we can also study
the combined effects discussed in Proposition 2.2 and 2.3. For this exercise, I
define investment efficiency (IE):
IE(k) = −|k − kFB|. (2.9)
This expression yields a maximized investment efficiency for first-best
investment k = kFB. It follows that IE(kFB) ≡ IEFB = 0.
For an exogenously assumed right-skewed distribution, the possibility
of earnings management unambiguously causes investment efficiency to dete-
riorate: dIE
dm
< 0. The effects of proposition 2.2 and 2.3 operate in the same
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direction. However, this is not the case for a left-skewed distribution. A small
amount of manipulation improves investment efficiency. There even exists a
manipulation width (m = mFB), such that investment efficiency reaches first-
best. This will occur, when the direct effect described in section 2.5 and the
interaction effect in section 2.6 exactly offset each other. Only when the ma-
nipulation range width exceeds the first-best optimal level (m > mFB) will a
wider range result in lower investment efficiency. This leads to the following
propositon.
Proposition 2.4 If the earnings distribution is right-skewed, then an
increase in the width of the manipulation range leads to lower investment
efficiency: dIE
dm
< 0. If earnings are left-skewed, investment is unobservable,
and analysts minimize the absolute error, then there exists a manipulation
range width m = mFB, such that IE = IEFB, and an increase in the deviation
from that width decreases efficiency, dIE
d|m−mFB | < 0.
The CEO wants to maximize the chances of meeting or beating the
forecast. With earnings management, the important cutoff for this endeavor
is z −m, the lower edge of the manipulation range. If earnings are above this
threshold, then he will succeed, either because earnings are high enough on
their own, or because manipulation elevates reported earnings to z. As the
manipulation range width m increases, z −m will decrease (z increases at a
slower rate thanm, see appendix). At some point for a left-skewed distribution,
z−m will be equal to E[x], expected unmanipulated earnings. If the manager
cannot influence shape parameters, then at that point he cannot improve his
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chances by deviating from first-best, because by definition E[x] is maximized
at first-best. As the manipulation potential grows even larger (m > mFB), the
lower bound of the range will be below mean unmanipulated earnings. Figure
2.4 illustrates this.
Figure 2.4: In this example, unmanipulated earnings x are distributed in the
shape of a mirrored Gamma distribution: f(−x) ∼ Γ(2, 1). It shows an exam-
ple, for which the lower edge of the manipualtion range, z −m, is below the
mean of the distribution. Thus, when m is large, even a left-skewed distribu-
tion can incentivize the CEO to reduce variance.
The managerial incentives then behave as if the distribution were right-
skewed. A decrease in variance causes some probability mass to shift to the
right of z −m, thus allowing the manager to manipulate those earnings real-
izations up to the forecast.
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2.7 Conclusion
Analysts try to accurately predict reported earnings, which are influenced by
managers’ investment and reporting decisions. Executives, when making these
decisions, try to increase their chances of beating the average analyst forecast.
Thus, both sides influence (and are influenced by) the other’s decision making
process, which is the focus of this paper. I obtain several results. First, the
number of analysts matters when it comes to the manager’s manipulation deci-
sion. When there are many analysts, each one has only a small influence on the
manager’s target. Thus, they take the reported earnings distribution as given,
and forecast the mean of said distribution. When there are few analysts, each
anticipates that a change in their forecast affects the manager’s behavior via a
change in the target. Taking this into account, analysts lower their forecasts,
compared to when there are more analysts. This change due to fewer analysts
results in more expected earnings management when the distribution is right-
skewed and less when it is left-skewed, providing an alternative explanation to
both the monitoring hypothesis and the pressure theory postulated by archival
studies, potentially explaining conflicting empirically observed results.
Second, the manager’s investment decision can be affected. When an-
alysts try to minimize the absolute forecast error and investment is unob-
servable, then the executive may deviate from first-best. The median of a
distribution can improve, even when the mean remains virtually unchanged.
The CEO can cause this, if investment affects the variance of the distribution.
When the distribution is left-skewed, an increase in variance is beneficial to
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the agent, when it is right-skewed, he prefers a decrease. Depending on the op-
portunity set of the agent, this can rationally explain the empirically observed
CEO long-shot bias.
Finally, I show that the interaction of investment and reporting deci-
sions incentivizes the manager to underinvest (i.e. reduce variance) in order
to improve the probability that earnings management allows him to beat the
target. Thus, for left-skewed distributions, the possibility of earnings manage-
ment can improve investment efficiency. The incentive to increase variance in
order to improve the median, and the incentive to decrease variance to improve
the efficiency of accounting manipulation can cancel each other out.
Combined, the findings of my paper provide a new perspective on several
research questions. Future research can attempt to empiricially validate the
predictions made in this paper.
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Chapter 3
Accounting Conservatism and
Convertible Debt
3.1 Introduction
One of the most important functions of accounting, maybe the most important,
is providing external investors with financial information about the company
that they plan to invest in or are already invested in. This creates an immediate
and direct link between accounting and the investors’ financing decisions. It
should therefore come as no surprise that properties of accounting such as
conservatism and precision influence this decision process. While these effects
have been studied extensively for straight debt (e.g. Gigler et al. 2009, Gao
2013, Li 2013) and equity (e.g. Zhang 2000, Penman and Zhang 2002, Francis
et al. 2004), convertible debt has been ignored. Lyandres and Zhdanov (2014)
report that in a typical year, new issues exceed $100 billion globally, indicating
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that they are of economic significance.
The goal of this paper is to address two unresolved questions of the
convertible bond literature: which theory best explains why firms issue con-
vertibles and why are there differences in the announcement effect between
countries. There are four main theories that provide an issuance motive: the
risk shifting theory (Green 1984), the risk uncertainty theory (Brennan and
Kraus 1987, Brennan and Schwartz 1988), the backdoor equity theory (Stein
1992), and the sequential financing theory (Mayers 1998). Yet, the archival
and survey literature provides mixed results about the applicability of these
four theories in the real world (see the literature review of Dutordoir et al.
2014). In this paper, I use the backdoor equity theory and am able to derive
results that can answer the second question mentioned above, while the other
three theories are not affected by accounting conservatism in the same way. I
achieve this by assuming that the signal is not perfect and potentially upward
or downward biased, thus departing from Stein (1992) and the perfect interim
signal used there.
Specifically, I consider a model in which a firm needs to raise money
from investors to fund a fixed-size investment opportunity. The firm knows
whether the project is likely to succeed or not, but the market does not. If the
company has a good project, then it wants to signal its type to the investors. It
can accomplish this, if it picks a different financial instrument than bad firms.
The available financing options are equity, convertible debt and straight debt.
At an interim stage, the accounting system produces an observable signal, and
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subsequently investors can exercise their conversion option (to equity) in the
case of convertible debt. If, at the very end, cash flows from the project are
insufficient to repay debt, then the firm suffers a cost of financial distress.
In the benchmark case with a perfect signal, for a sufficiently high cost
of financial distress, bad firms will issue equity while good firms choose con-
vertibles. Investors will convert to equity after a high signal that reveals the
firm to be good. This is optimal because then they will receive an uncapped
share of the profits, outperforming debt. However, after a low signal, revealing
a bad firm, investors would stick with debt, because the prospect of an un-
capped profit share from high cash flows would be too dismal. This behavior
guarantees that bad firms do not find it optimal to issue convertible bonds to
mimic good firms as they would remain stuck on debt, subject to potential
financial distress. Good firms achieve their ideal situation, because they are
able to separate from bad firms, while not threatened by financial distress due
to investors converting to equity.
These findings are not sustainable with an imperfect signal. The key
problem is that in a perfectly separating equilibrium, investors would ignore
the signal and go with their belief that only good firms issue convertible debt.
As a result, they would always convert to equity. Unfortunately, this eliminates
the threat for bad firms that they could get stuck on debt, and they now have
no reason not to imitate the behavior of good firms, destroying the equilibrium.
To solve this issue, some bad firms have to issue convertibles, making the signal
relevant. In fact, the less imprecise the signal, the more bad firms have to
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switch from issuing equity to issuing convertibles. This is necessary because
investors must find it optimal to not convert to equity after a bad signal. If the
signal is less reliable, then the prior belief will be updated less, and a change
in the behavior of bad firms affects the prior belief.
These changes have several implications. First, good firms bear all the
costs of the decrease in reliability of the signal because, in equilibrium, bad
firms will always be indifferent between their choices. Otherwise, a mixed
strategy equilibrium would not be possible. Second, firms will experience
financial distress more often. This holds for good firms due to the signal’s
increased likelihood of being false, and it holds for bad firms due to their
changing behavior, there is no chance of distress after issuing equity. It should
be noted that a certain accounting precision must be upheld. If the signal is
too noisy, then one of two things will happen. Either the good firms do not
find it optimal to issue convertibles and rather try to separate using straight
debt, or the investors would not convert to equity, even after a high signal,
thus eliminating any advantage that convertibles would have had.
I now turn towards the effects of conservatism. These will be the ones
providing possible answers to the above mentioned questions. It is instructive
to start with a very aggressive accounting system. In this case, it is possible
to sustain a separating equilibrium. The important property of aggressive
accounting is that a low signal is very informative. As a result, bad firms are
not needed to ensure that investors do not convert to equity after a low signal.
There is one important difference, though, compared to the case with a perfect
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signal. The incentive for bad firms to mimic good firms’ behavior is increased
due to the increased likelihood of a high signal, a more likely conversion to
equity, and hence a lower distress probability. To counteract this, a higher
cost of financial distress is necessary to keep incentives in balance. If this is
satisfied, then the decreased informativeness of the high signal is irrelevant
because the investors’ prior belief makes them convert to equity after such a
signal.
As the accounting becomes more conservative, the low signal becomes
less informative. Thus, some similar forces as above with a decrease in ac-
counting precision are at play. Investors need to stick with debt after a low
signal. If, due to conservative accounting, many good firms end up reporting
low earnings, then this can only be achieved if some bad firms issue convert-
ibles. While these firms are kept indifferent, good firms have to bear the cost.
These costs include more unfavorable financial terms because investors do not
know that they are dealing with a good firm, and increased costs of finan-
cial distress driven by the increased chance of a low signal and investors not
converting to equity.
These results can explain two unresolved questions of the convertible
bond literature. When firms announce that they will issue convertible bonds,
then there is an effect on the stock price. This effect is not uniform around
the world. While the effect is significantly negative in the USA (Rahim et al.
2014), it is nonnegative or even positive in countries such as Japan (Kang and
Stulz 1996), Taiwan (Chang et al. 2004), and the Netherlands (De Roon and
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Veld 1998). These differences can be explained by differences in accounting
conservatism. The USA has very conservative accounting in contrast to the
other countries mentioned above (e.g. Weetman and Gray 1991, Ball et al.
2000, Li 2015). According to the results of my paper, investors will correctly
assume that the average quality of issuers of convertibles is inferior when ac-
counting is conservative, which will be reflected in the market capitalization.
In my model, there can only be a positive announcement effect for convert-
ibles. However, this can easily be fixed by going back to a model with three
types (good, medium, and bad firms) as was the case in Stein (1992). The
other unresolved question is about the validity of four issuer motive theories:
the risk shifting theory, the risk uncertainty theory, the backdoor equity the-
ory, and the sequential financing theory. The fact that the backdoor equity
model used in this paper can explain these differences between countries, gives
further support to this theory. The other three theories provide (non-)results
with respect to conservatism that are at odds with the observed pattern. Thus,
it appears that the backdoor equity theory is the most applicable one in the
real world.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses re-
lated literature, section 3.3 describes the model, section 3.4 analyzes the sce-
nario with a perfect signal, section 3.5 discusses the main results, section 3.6
explores short-term debt and other issuance motives theories, and section 3.7
concludes. All proofs are in appendix C.
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3.2 Related Literature
The convertible bond literature has received quite a bit of attention over the
past few decades. The two streams that are most relevant for this paper are
about issuance motives and shareholder wealth effects. There are four often-
cited theories on issuance motives. The oldest one of these is the risk shifting
theory of Green (1984). The risk shifting problem states that firms will shift
to more risky strategies after they took on more debt, even if this does not
maximize total cash flows. This is optimal for shareholders because a leveraged
structure turns stocks into options. If cash flows fall below the face value of
debt, then a further drop does not impact shareholders. However, they get
the full value of any increase that exceeds the face value of debt. Debtholders
anticipate this issue and demand a higher nominal interest rate. Convertibles
can alleviate this problem because it gives debtholders the option to convert
to equity if cash flows turn out to be higher than expected. Thus, original
shareholders no longer receive the full increase, and the upside of risk shifting
is diminished.
The second one is the risk uncertainty theory by Brennan and Kraus
(1987). This theory argues that a firm’s manager may have superior knowl-
edge about the risk of the company than the investors do. If the manager
knows that the risk is lower than the market’s perception, then debt will be
underpriced (and vice versa) from the manager’s point of view. This could
keep him from issuing debt and thus forgoing profitable investments. A con-
vertible bond introduces an option to convert into equity. This option value
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will be overpriced, if the manager knows that firm risk is actually lower than
perceived. Combining these two observations yields the result that over- and
undervaluation will cancel each other out and the convertible debt is fairly
priced, eliminating the asymmetric information cost.
The third one, which is the one that this paper spends most of its
focus on, is the backdoor equity theory of Stein (1992). Stein makes the
case that there is asymmetric information about the fundamental firm value
and that financial instruments can be used as signalling devices to reduce
adverse selection costs. Firms have a preference towards equity because that
avoids the cost of financial distress. Convertibles can help solve this problem
by simultaneously signalling firm type and avoiding financial distress. This is
achieved by structuring the convertible bond in a way such that the conversion
decision is made after information asymmetry is resolved. Good firms will issue
debt because it is assumed that there is no potential risk of financial distress,
medium firms will issue convertibles that investors always convert to equity,
and bad firms will issue stocks.
The last and most recent theory is the sequential financing theory (May-
ers 1998). Mayers uses two forces: issue costs and overinvestment incentives.
Whenever a firm raises funds, it incurs a substantial amount of issue costs,
some of which are fixed, some variable. This would imply that long-term debt
is preferable to short-term debt. On the other hand, if a manager has funds
available, he will use them even if the project has a negative net present value.
This would imply that short-term debt is preferable to long-term debt. Con-
67
vertible bonds can combine the best of both worlds to solve this problem. If
the future project turns out to be profitable, investors will convert to equity,
leave the funds in the firm and issue costs are minimized. If the project should
not be executed, then investors insist on the debt repayment, do not convert to
equity, withdraw the funds, and hence minimize the overinvestment problem.
The other stream of the convertibles literature is about shareholder
wealth effects, and more specifically relevant for this paper the announcement
effect. If the choice of financing instrument is a signal about firm character-
istics, then one would expect the market to react to the announcement of a
new issuance. Consistent with the predictions of Myers and Majluf (1984)
and Stein (1992), Eckbo et al. (2007) find that the announcement effect of
convertibles (-1.8%) is between the effect for straight bonds (-0.2% and non-
significant) and seasoned equity (-2.2%). However, the effect is not uniform
across the globe. The meta-analysis of Rahim et al. (2014) provides a com-
prehensive overview and shows that the effect is significantly more negative in
the USA than in other countries. For some countries such as Japan, Taiwan,
and the Netherlands, the announcement effect is even nonnegative.
The third and last stream of literature relevant for this paper is about
accounting conservatism. Basu (1997) defines conservatism as ”resulting in
earnings reflecting ‘bad news’ more quickly than ‘good news’.” The most im-
portant analytical paper to combine conservatism and corporate finance is
Gigler et al. (2009), who showed that the prevailing wisdom that conser-
vatism is good for debt contracting does not necessarily have to be true. In-
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ternationally, there are however differences in the degree of conservatism. Con-
sistently, the USA and its Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
rank among the most conservative systems (e.g. Weetman and Gray 1991,
Ball et al. 2000, Li 2015).
3.3 Model
The model is a simplified and extended version of Stein (1992). There is a
risk-neutral firm and many risk-neutral investors, the interest rate is zero.
The firm has a project for which it needs to raise funds from investors.
Timing: There are three dates: t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. At t = 0, the firm has an
investment opportunity available. The project quality is known to the firm,
but not to the investors. The firm needs to raise the funds and can do so by
issuing either ordinary shares, straight long-term debt or convertibles. Short-
term debt is considered in a separate section. At t = 1, the accounting system
generates a signal that is informative about the project quality. After the
signal, if convertible bonds had been issued, the investors can either convert
to equity or stick with debt. At t = 2, the project cash flow is realized and
investors receive their payment according to the held financial instrument. If
the face value of debt exceeds cash flows, then the firm suffers a cost of financial
distress, and the game ends. Figure 3.1 depicts the timeline.
Investment project: At t = 0, the firm has a fixed-size investment
opportunity available. In order to pursue it, it needs to raise and invest capital
I from external sources. Cash flow X from the project arrives at t = 2 and can
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of the Model
be either high or low: X ∈ {XH , XL}. I use the notation ∆X = XH −XL > 0.
The probability θ that the project generates high cash flows is known to the
firm, but not to the investors and can either be θG or θB. For simplicity, I will
refer to firms, whose project succeeds with the higher probability θG as good
firms (G) and the other firms as bad ones (B). The investors prior belief about
project quality is that a firm is good with probability v. Necessary restrictions
to generate nontrivial solutions are XL+θB∆X > I > XL. The first inequality
guarantees that bad firms can raise funds even when investors know that they
are bad. The second inequality ensures that the face value of debt (which will
be at least I) can exceed the cash flow.
Financial instruments: I restrict the analysis to the following three
ways for the firm to raise funds at t = 0: ordinary shares, straight long-term
debt, and convertible bonds. The case of short-term debt is addressed in a
separate section. Ordinary shares represent the claim to a certain percentage
ΨE of the cash flows, so investors receive ΨEXH or ΨEXL at t = 2. The
second option is long-term debt. This debt can be described as a claim that
pays the investors the lower value of the face value FD and the cash flow X,
i.e. min{FD, X}. Given the restriction I > XL, the face value FD will be
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greater than the low cash flow XL and therefore creditors receive either XL
if cash flows are low or FD if they are high. Furthermore, if the face value
exceeds cash flows, then the firm experiences financial distress and suffers a
cost C. This cost is nonnegotiable and personal. It can represent the time
and money wasted on dealing with a looming bankruptcy. Lastly, the firm can
issue convertible bonds. These are, if no conversion occurs, just like straight
debt with a face value FC and a claim to receive the lower value of FC and cash
flow X, i.e. min{FC , X} at t = 2. However, at t = 1, the investors have the
option to convert their claim into equity. Specifically, they can opt to receive
a fraction ΨC of the firm’s cash flows at t = 2, i.e. ΨCXH or ΨCXL.
Accounting system: At t = 1, the accounting system generates a
binary signal S that can either be high or low: S ∈ {SH , SL} and provides
information about the project’s quality. The probabilities depend on project
quality and are as follows:
pHG = Pr(SH |G) = 1− (1− p)c,
pLG = Pr(SL|G) = (1− p)c,
pHB = Pr(SH |B) = (1− p)(1− c),
pLB = Pr(SL|B) = p+ (1− p)c.
This structure deviates slightly from prior literature (e.g. Venugopalan
2004, Chen et al. 2007, Bertomeu et al. 2016), but its interpretation is much
the same. p ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as accounting precision or informative-
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ness. As p increases, both pHG and pLB increase and the signal is more likely
correct. At the extremes, it is either perfectly informative (for p = 1) or com-
pletely uninformative (for p = 0). The deviation from prior literature is such
that in this model a decrease in p affects both signals and not just the high
one. c ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of accounting conservatism or bias. As c increases,
the probability of a bad signal increases for both fundamental types, and vice
versa. Also, the probability structure satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio
property, pHG ≥ pHB.
3.4 Perfect Signal
In this section, I assume that the signal at t = 1 is perfectly informative about
firm type, i.e. p = 1. The following is similar to the result obtained in Stein
(1992) and is used as a benchmark to contrast the later results. With a perfect
signal, a separating equilibrium can be achieved. Proposition 1 summarizes
this equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 For sufficiently high costs of financial distress (defined
further below) and a perfectly informative signal (p = 1), the following is a
sustainable separating equilibrium:
(i) bad firms issue a fraction ΨE =
I
XL+θB∆X
of equity and invest,
(ii) good firms issue convertible bonds with a conversion ratio ΨC =
I
XL+θG∆X
, face value FC =
1
θG
(I − (1− θG)XL), and invest.
It is instructive in proving this equilibrium to analyze all three potential
actors: good firms, bad firms, and investors. All of them have to find it optimal
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to behave in the way the equilibrium describes it.
Beginning with the investors’ point of view: if they observe an equity
issue, they know that it must be a bad firm. Therefore, they expect that
this firm will generate a cash flow of XL + θB∆X on average. Logically, the
issued shares will be worth ΨEX or ΨE(XL+θB∆X) in expectation. Using the
expression for ΨE from Proposition 1 shows that the shares are worth exactly
I and the firm is able to finance its project. If investors observe a convertible
bonds issue, then they know that the firm is a good one and the accounting
signal will be high. At t = 1, investors have to make a decision. If they switch
to equity, then their claim is worth ΨCX or I. If they do not convert, then
their claim is worth θGFC + (1 − θG)XL which simplifies to I. Investors are
indifferent and will switch to equity (alternatively, one could slightly reduce
the face value to eliminate indifference) and the firm is able to finance its
project. Even though, on the equilibrium path, the signal will never be low
after a convertible issue, it is still necessary to analyze this path as this will
be relevant for the perspective of a bad firm. In that case, investors would
stick with debt as that claim would be worth more than the equity they would
receive:
I
XL + θG∆X
(XL + θB∆X) < θBFC + (1− θB)XL. (3.1)
The above inequality is intuitively true because investors are indifferent
when they know the firm is good. If the firm is bad, then the probability
of receiving the higher upside of equity decreases and the probability of the
higher downside increases, making the left-hand side strictly lower than the
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right-hand side.
Good firms have no incentive to deviate because the equilibrium is the
best case scenario for them. They are able to completely separate from bad
firms while at the same time avoiding costs of financial distress. There is no
way for them to improve upon this position.
Lastly, it has to be true that bad firms actually prefer issuing equity.
If they follow the equilibrium strategy of issuing equity, then they will reap
the full benefit of the project: XL + θB∆X − I because investors are held
at break-even and there is no cost of financial distress. There is a benefit
and a cost to deviating and issuing convertible bonds. The benefit is that
investors would mistakenly assume that the firm is good and grant it better
financing conditions, resulting in a lower face value of debt than they would
otherwise be willing to give a bad firm. The cost is the potential cost of
financial distress, if cash flows are insufficient to repay investors. This yields
the following inequality condition that has to be satisfied:
θB(XH − FC)− (1− θB)C ≤ XL + θB∆X − I, (3.2)
which can be rearranged to show that costs of financial distress have to
be sufficiently high:
(1− θB)C ≥ 1
θG
(θG − θB) (I −XL) > 0. (3.3)
The signal (e.g. accounting profits) is of utmost importance in the
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separating equilibrium. It gives investors some control and allows them to
treat good and bad firms differently. Without a signal, bad firms could always
mimic good firms’ behavior and benefit from cheaper financing, subsidized by
good firms. This exemplary illustrates that convertible bonds can only work
when investors behave differently depending on the signal. If the signal is
high, investors should find it optimal to convert to equity, and if the signal
is low, they should optimally stick with debt. In the case of a perfect signal,
this is not a problem as investors immediately and completely disregard any
prior belief and update it with the information gained from the signal. It will
become clear in the next section that this will not happen once the signal is
no longer perfect.
3.5 Imperfect Signal
In this section, I no longer restrict the precision of the signal: p ∈ [0, 1). As I
alluded to at the end of the last section, it now no longer is the case that any
prior belief will be disregarded once the signal arrives. This is best illustrated
by the above described separating equilibrium. If an investor observes a con-
vertible bonds issue at t = 0, then he correctly surmises that the firm is good.
But now it is not impossible that the signal at t = 1 is low on the equilibrium
path. Thus, he will deduce that the signal is incorrect, not change his belief
about the firm’s type, and convert to equity regardless. So far, this would not
be a problem. However, the investor no longer changes his conversion decision
based on the signal; the signal is meaningless. A bad firm would anticipate
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these consequences and rationally issue convertibles, benefit from cheaper fi-
nancing conditions, and be guaranteed to not suffer financial distress. Clearly,
the equilibrium is not stable and falls apart.
Since a completely separating equilibrium is not possible, some bad
firms need to issue convertible debt, z (an unconditional probability). From
the perspective of investors, two probabilities are important: the probability
that a firm is good after a high signal,
Pr(G|SH) = σ1 = (1− (1− p)c)v
(1− (1− p)c)v + (1− p)(1− c)z , (3.4)
and the probability that a firm is good after a low signal,
Pr(G|SL) = σ2 = (1− p)cv
(1− p)cv + (p+ (1− p)c)z . (3.5)
Given the fact that the signal is informative, it is the case that σ1 ≥
v
v+z
≥ σ2. A high signal improves the chance that the firm is good, while a
low signal reduces that chance.
For an equilibrium to be stable, several conditions have to be met. First,
investors have to find it optimal to convert to equity after a high signal:
ΨC(σ1(XL + θG∆X) + (1− σ1)(XL + θB∆X)) ≥
≥ σ1(XL + θG(FC −XL)) + (1− σ1)(XL + θB(FC −XL)). (3.6)
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Second, investors must not convert to equity after a low signal:
ΨC(σ2(XL + θG∆X) + (1− σ2)(XL + θB∆X)) ≤
≤ σ2(XL + θG(FC −XL)) + (1− σ2)(XL + θB(FC −XL)). (3.7)
Given the unambigious effect of an increase in the number of bad firms
issuing convertibles (z) on σ1 and σ2, (3.6) and (3.7) create a lower bound, z
and an upper bound z. Hence, as I explain in the appendix, multiple equilibria
are possible. Furthermore, from the investors’ perspective, they need to break-
even. If they would in expectation incur a loss, then they would not be willing
to provide the funds for the investment project.
I(v+z) = v(1−p)c(XL+θG(FC−XL))+z(p+(1−p)c)(XL+θB(FC−XL))+
+ ΨC(v(1− (1− p)c)(XL + θG∆X) + z(1− p)(1− c)(XL + θB∆X)) (3.8)
The left-hand side represents the expected funds for firms that will issue
convertible debt. The first term on the right-hand side captures claims when
investors stick with debt, while the second term captures claims when investors
switch to equity.
I now turn to the firms’ strategy. Starting with good firms, they need to
find it optimal to issue convertible bonds. Three other options are available:
issue long-term debt, issue equity, and not raising any funds. The first one,
long-term debt, is tricky, because no firms on the equilibrium path that I
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focus on, use this financial instrument. The investors’ beliefs can be defined
freely. To simplify the analysis, I assume that investors believe a firm issuing
long-term debt is a bad one. In this case, there is no incentive for anyone to
go down this path. This assumption has to be revisited, if the model were
to consist of three firm types and the best firms issue long-term debt. The
other two options, though, are potentially better and must be ruled out. Not
raising any funds, which gives the firm zero utility, will always be dominated
by issuing equity, which gives the firm strictly positive utility. Thus, one
inequality remains:
(1− (1− p)c)(1−ΨC)(XL + θG∆X) + (1− p)c(θG(XH −FC)− (1− θG)C) ≥
≥ (1−ΨE)(XL + θG∆X). (3.9)
Lastly, there is the point of view of bad firms. As I showed above, for
an equilibrium with imprecise signals to work, some bad firms have to issue
convertibles in order to make the signal relevant for investors’ decision making.
This means that they have to be indifferent between issuing convertibles and
equity. Otherwise, if they would strictly prefer one over the other, all of them
would pick the same strategy.
XL + θB∆X − I =
= (1−p)(1−c)(1−ΨC)(XL+θB∆X)+(p+(1−p)c)(θB(XH−FC)−(1−θB)C)
(3.10)
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The left-hand side is dramatically simplified because investors know
that a firm issuing equity is bad. Thus, there is no mispricing and investors
get their funds back, in expectation. Note also that the LHS is independent
of the accounting system. This implies that regardless of accounting precision
and conservatism, bad firms always receive the same utility. I summarize this
insight in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.1 In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the utility of bad firms is
independent of the accounting system.
The above insight is crucial. Not only is bad firms’ utility unchanged,
investors are, by assumption, also always held at the same utility (i.e. break-
even). Thus, any change in social welfare is completely borne by good firms.
Since every firm always receives sufficient funds to invest and execute its
project, the only change in social surplus is the cost of financial distress. The
accounting system affects the overall cost of financial distress in two ways:
directly via the probability of a low signal, and indirectly via the likelihood
of a convertibles issue by bad firms. First, the direct effect: If conservatism
increases, then the accounting is more likely to report low profits. After a low
signal, investors stick with debt and do not switch to equity, thus giving rise
to the financial distress problem, if cash flows turn out to be low. The indirect
effect works as follows: When the accounting system becomes less precise and
more conservative, then more good firms will report a low signal at t = 1. To
keep investors from equity conversion, more bad firms have to issue convert-
ibles. This ensures that a low signal is still likely enough to come from a bad
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firm. As more bad firms issue convertibles, and not equity, financial distress
is increasingly probable. The above intuition is summarized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 3.2 As the accounting system becomes conservative (c >
0) or imprecise (p < 1), bad firms will issue convertible bonds (z > 0) as com-
pared to the pure strategy equilibrium of Proposition 3.1. Also, the resulting
societal increase in costs of financial distress is completely borne by good firms.
The insight from Proposition 3.2 can be used to more directly address
the main questions of the convertible bonds literature that this paper tries to
answer. An unanswered question is about the differential announcement effect
of convertibles between countries. The announcement effect is the difference
in firm value for the initial owners. At the beginning of the game, at t = 0, all
firms are valued the same because no information about firm type is known to
investors and current owners cannot credibly convey their superior knowledge.
Thus, at t = 0 the initial shares are valued at
V0 = XL + (vθG + (1− v)θB)∆X − I. (3.11)
The first factor of the second summand is the average probability of high
cash flows. Costs of financial distress are not included due to the assumption
that these are borne by the entrepreneur, and not by investors, who would
buy some of the shares. The value of those initial shares after a convertibles
issue rises to
VC = XL + (
v
v + z
θG +
z
v + z
θB)∆X − I. (3.12)
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From (3.12) it becomes clear that an increase in the number of bad
firms issuing convertibles (z) will decrease the firm value and hence the an-
nouncement effect (i.e. VC − V0). Together with the insight from Proposition
3.2, this shows that an increase in conservatism decreases the announcement
effect. This is summarized in Propositon 3.3.
Proposition 3.3 When the accounting system is conservative (c > 0),
then the announcement effect (VC−V0) is lower compared to the pure strategy
equilibrium of Proposition 3.1.
This conclusion is critical to answering the question of why the an-
nouncement effect is different around the world. Dutordoir et al. (2014)
write in their literature review: ”[L]ittle is known about why convertible bond
announcements made in countries like Japan and The Netherlands provoke
non-negative stock reactions.” And Rahim et al. (2014) in their meta analysis
find: ”Abnormal returns for hybrid securities issued in the United States are
significantly more negative than those issued in other countries. [...] Finally,
several factors identified as important by theory or in prior research are not
significant within our cross-study models.” In the literature, the USA is con-
sistently among the countries with the most conservative accounting system
(e.g. Weetman and Gray 1991, Ball et al. 2000, Li 2015), which explains why
the announcement effect is more negative there. Similarly, the nonnegative
and positive effects in Japan and the Netherlands can also be explained this
way. As shown in the above mentioned prior literature, these countries have
a very low amount of accounting conservatism. For example, Weetman and
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Gray (1991) conclude: ”[T]here is evidence to suggest that Dutch GAAP are
at the less conservative end of the spectrum of financial reporting measure-
ment practices.” Naturally, a formal statistical test is required to confirm the
observed pattern, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.6 Miscellaneous
3.6.1 Comparative Statics
There are basically three variables which combined determine the equilibrium.
While the share of bad firms issuing convertibles (z) is certainly the most
important for this paper, the other two, face value of debt, FC , and conversion
ratio, ΨC , shall not be neglected. The following observations can be made
about their relationship.
Corollary 3.1 (i) If, and only if, the accounting is precise enough
(p > p∗ as defined in the appendix), then the face value of the convertibles, FC ,
is increasing as the number of bad firms issuing convertibles, z, is decreasing,
i.e. dFC
dz
< 0.
(ii) If the face value of the convertibles, FC , is increased, then the con-
version ratio, ΨC , has to decrease, i.e.
dΨC
dFC
< 0, holding the accounting system
constant.
The second insight is directly derived from the indifference condition for
bad firms. They must always be kept indifferent between issuing convertibles
and issuing equity. The utility derived from the latter is constant. when the
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conversion ratio increases, then these firms will benefit less as they get to
keep less shares. To balance this out, the face value has to decrease, meaning
that they will keep more funds after success. This result holds for a constant
accounting system as a change in precision or conservatism of course would
also affect the conversion probability.
This ties into the first observation. If bad firms are more likely to
issue convertibles, then this adversely affects investors as they of course would
prefer to lend money to a respectable firm. However, given corollary 1(ii), it
is not possible to simply increase both the face value and the conversion ratio.
To solve this problem, the financial terms have to become more beneficial
to investors, while not hurting bad firms. Hence, good firms have to suffer.
When the accounting is precise enough, then good firms are far more likely
to achieve conversion after a high signal than bad firms. Thus, increasing the
conversion ratio while decreasing the face value will hurt good firms while bad
ones are indifferent. This pattern flips as the accounting becomes too noisy.
The difference in conversion probability is small enough such that it is now no
longer the dominant force. The pattern is dominated by the fact that bad firms
are more likely to receive the low cash flow and they therefore care more about
keeping more funds in that case, which will be the case when the conversion
ratio is smaller, and hence the face value is higher.
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3.6.2 Short-Term Debt
So far, short-term debt was exogenously excluded from the analysis. This, of
course, is a little bit unsatisfying. In the model in its present form, short-
term debt could reasonably fulfill the role played by convertible bonds. Firms,
instead of using convertibles, issue short-term debt. At t = 1, they could then
issue equity after they were able to distinguish themselves from bad firms via
the accounting signal, assuming the signal was high. As Stein (1992) showed,
a more complex model can avoid the separating equilibrium using short-term
debt. If good firms receive additional information about its project’s quality
at t = 1, and if there is a liquidation option, then it is possible that firms
that receive good news will choose not to raise new funds via an equity issue,
because they are undervalued. Instead, they opt to liquidate some of their
assets to repay the loan. However, this creates an ex-ante inefficiency due to
the lack of commitment to an equity issue. Convertibles can contractually
commit firms because it is investors, who decide whether to convert to equity
or not, thus avoiding the ex-ante inefficient liquidation of assets. Stein shows
that for a sufficiently low (but positive) net present value and a sufficiently
high (but inefficient) liquidation value, short-term debt may not be optimal.
Another way of endogenously excluding short-term debt would be to in-
troduce issue costs as in Mayers (1998). Assuming that raising funds involves
variable and fixed costs, it is efficient to only raise funds once, instead of twice,
which would occur with short-term debt. Costs for the services provided by
investment banks, auditors, and stock exchanges can be nonnegligible. While
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short-term debt raised from a single bank is usually less costly, big debt obli-
gations raised from bond markets have significant issue costs, too.
3.6.3 Three other convertibles theories
The model in this paper uses the backdoor equity theory of Stein (1992).
There are, however, three other main issuance motives theories (see the related
literature section). It is still an unresolved question in the literature which one
of these best describes the real world. Dutordoir et al. (2014) conclude that
empirical studies ”do not reveal a clear pattern of evidence” for or against
one of the four theories. As shown above, Stein’s theory can explain and is
consistent with an observed and previously unexplained pattern. Below, I will
delve into the other three theories to determine what empirical predictions
these generate with respect to conservatism.
First is the risk shifting theory of Green (1984). In that model, account-
ing does not play a role at all. The relevant problem does not occur due to
asymmetric information, but due to a moral hazard. The firm, after securing
debt, chooses a riskier, potentially slightly less profitable strategy at the ex-
pense of debt holders. Even if investors are fully informed, the moral hazard
problem still persists, assuming that project selection or strategy choice is not
contractible. Thus, it appears that the risk shifting theory does not explain
the pattern of differential announcement effects across the globe.
Second is the risk uncertainty theory by Brennan and Kraus (1987).
This theory claims that convertible bonds can be optimal when investors do
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not know the risk of the company. A convertible can be structured such that
its debt component is overvalued (undervalued), while its equity component
is undervalued (overvalued). An accounting signal, regardless of its downward
or upward bias, could resolve some of the uncertainty about risk, but not all
of it. Thus, convertibles still serve a role of basically threading the needle.
Again, it seems unclear how conservatism would affect the likelihood of a firm
using convertibles (other than affecting its features, e.g. the conversion ratio).
Lastly, there is the sequential financing theory of Mayers (1998). Part
of this theory is the (exogenously assumed) moral hazard of overinvestment.
However, accounting still plays a crucial role in this model because they can
intervene in the interim by pulling their funds out of the firm. The question of
whether conservatism affects the preference towards convertibles depends on
whether one assumes that the manager has superior knowledge of the project’s
quality. The original paper did not need to specify this assumption as both
investors and firm are perfectly informed once the decision to pull funds has
to be made. If there is no asymmetric information with imperfect accounting,
then convertibles always dominate. This changes if the firm has superior in-
formation. It is then possible that long-term debt is better than convertibles.
The ranking depends on the severity of the overinvestment problem and the
average project quality. If the manager has such a strong preference towards
investment over no investment that he is willing to execute substantially nega-
tive net present value projects, then convertibles are better. The same is true
if the project is rarely of high quality, again intensifying the overinvestment
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problem. The advantage of long-term debt is that the firm can use its superior
knowledge and avoid inefficient fund withdrawal if they know that the project’s
quality is good. These two forces thus determine the effect of conservatism.
If overinvestment is a concern and the average project quality is low, then
convertibles are always better than long-term debt. However, if this is not the
case, then a more aggressive accounting system benefits convertibles as this
decreases the chances of an inefficient fund withdrawal. Empirical predictions
from this model include that in countries and companies with better corporate
governance (and thus a lower overinvestment problem) and at prosperous eco-
nomic times, convertibles will be used more often, but it is not clear how this
would affect the announcement effect as this is not a signalling model. The
proof is in appendix C.
3.7 Conclusion
This study examines the effects of a signal generated by an accounting system
on the use of convertible bonds. When the signal is perfect, then a separating
equilibrium in which bad firms issue equity and good firms issue convertibles
can be sustained because investors use the signal for their conversion decision.
If the signal is high, they convert to equity to benefit from the increased
upside; and when the signal is low, they stick with debt to better protect
against the increased downside. However, once the accounting system becomes
imprecise, a separating equilibrium breaks down. Investors would know that a
firm issuing convertible debt is good, attribute a low signal to noise, and always
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convert to equity. Consequently, bad firms would anticipate this behavior
and mimic the behavior of good firms. Thus, some bad firms need to issue
convertibles in equilibrium when the signal is not perfect.
A similar logic applies to conservatism. An aggressive accounting sys-
tem improves the quality of a low signal, thus reducing the necessity for bad
firms to issue convertibles in order to keep investors from converting to equity.
The reduced number of bad firms issuing convertibles simultaneously improves
the perceived firm quality after a high signal. For conservative accounting, bad
firms need to issue convertibles to offset the fact that investors would otherwise
ignore a low signal and simply always convert to equity.
These results can help answer two unresolved questions of the convert-
ible bonds literature. The first asks why the announcement effect of convert-
ibles is different for different countries. The effect is significantly negative in
the USA, larger than in other countries, consistent with the fact that US-
GAAP prescribes a very conservative accounting. Additionally, the effect is
nonnegative or positive in the Netherlands, Japan, and Taiwan, consistent with
their more aggressive accounting. The second question is about the applica-
bility of four main theories. This paper provides evidence that the backdoor
equity theory by Stein (1992) can explain patterns that the other theories can-
not. While the backdoor equity theory is consistent with the country-specific
announcement effects pattern, the other theories are not.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 1
Proof for Proposition 1.1
The agent’s effort incentive constraint is
(ph+γ)qwSG+(ph−γ)(1− q)wSB +(1−ph−γ)qwFG+(1−ph+γ)(1−
q)wFB − c ≥ (pl + γ)qwSG + (pl− γ)(1− q)wSB + (1− pl− γ)qwFG + (1− pl +
γ)(1− q)wFB
This can be rearranged to
q(wSG − wFG) + (1− q)(wSB − wFB) ≥ c
ph − pl (A.1)
From this expression, it is clear that wFG = wFB = 0 is optimal. As a
result, the principal solves the following simplified problem:
min
wSB ,wSG
(ph − γ)(1− q)wSB + (ph + γ)qwSG (A.2)
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s.t. qwSG + (1− q)wSB = c
ph − pl . (A.3)
Since both the objective function and the constraint are linear in the
arguments, the solution will be a corner solution. Hence, I simply examine
both possible solutions.
Case 1 : wSG = 0
wSB =
c
(1− q)(ph − pl) , (A.4)
E[w] =
(ph − γ)c
ph − pl . (A.5)
Case 2 : wSB = 0
wSG =
c
q(ph − pl) , (A.6)
E[w] =
(ph + γ)c
ph − pl . (A.7)
Comparing the two expressions for the expected wage shows
(ph − γ)c
(ph − pl) <
(ph + γ)c
(ph − pl) , (A.8)
because γ > 0 and therefore wSB > wSG is optimal, proving Proposition
1.1.
I now quickly describe the proof for the risk-aversion case, which shows
the trade-off that I mentioned in the text.
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The principal’s problem can be stated in the following Lagrange form.
Max
wSB ,wSG
L = −(ph − γ)(1− q)wSB − (ph + γ)qwSG+
+ λ(qu(wSG) + (1− q)u(wSB)− c
ph − pl ) (A.9)
Taking the derivatives with respect to the arguments yields
dL
dwSB
= −(ph − γ)(1− q) + λ(1− q)u′(wSB) = 0 (A.10)
and
dL
dwSG
= −(ph + γ)q + λqu′(wSG) = 0. (A.11)
After solving both for λ and using some algebra, I arrive at the following
expression:
u′(wSG)
u′(wSB)
=
ph + γ
ph − γ > 1. (A.12)
This fraction shows that wSB > wSG given the standard features of a
risk-averse utility function.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
The agent’s utility function for high effort is
U = (ph+γ)qwSG+(ph−γ)(1−q)wSB+(1−ph−γ)q(mGwSG+(1−mG)wFG)+
+ (1− ph + γ)(1− q)(mBwSB + (1−mB)wFB)− c−
− (1− ph − γ)q gm
2
G
2
− (1− ph + γ)(1− q)gm
2
B
2
(A.13)
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Since wFG and wFB will not incentivize effort for the same reasons as
in the case above, they will be zero. This simplifies the above equation.
To get the manipulation decision, I take the first derivative of U with
respect to mG and mB respectively:
dU
dmB
= wSB − gmB = 0, (A.14)
d
dmG
= wSG − gmG = 0, (A.15)
I also need an effort incentive constraint:
q((1−mG)wSG + gm
2
G
2
) + (1− q)((1−mB)wSB + gm
2
B
2
) ≥ c
(ph − pl) . (A.16)
Plugging (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.16), and solving for wSG yields
wSG = g(1−
√
1− 2
gq
(
c
(ph − pl) − (1− q)((1−
wSB
g
)wSB +
w2SB
2g
))). (A.17)
Plugging all of the above generated insights into (1.7) gives
E[m] =
wSB
g
(1− ph + γ)(1− q)+
+ (1−
√
1− 2
gq
(
c
(ph − pl) − (1− q)((1−
wSB
g
)wSB +
w2SB
2g
)))(1− ph − γ)q.
(A.18)
Taking the derivative of E[m] with respect to wSB, and plugging (A.17)
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back in for simplicity results in
dE[m]
dwSB
=
1
g
(1− ph + γ)(1− q)− 1
g
(1− ph − γ)g − wSB
g − wSG (1− q). (A.19)
If wSB = wSG, then the equation simplifies to γ > 0. If wSB > wSG,
then the derivate is even greater, hence proving the first part of Proposition
1.2.
To solve for the minimum, I set the equation equal to zero. To check,
whether the solution is a corner solution, I set wSB = 0, and solve for wSG. I
eventually arrive at the following condition for a corner solution
g > gT =
c(1− ph + γ)2
2γq (ph − pl) (1− ph) , (A.20)
proving the second part of Proposition 1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.3
When wSB 6= wSG, then (A.14) and (A.15) show that when the bench-
mark is observable, the optimal manipulation choice is mB 6= mG. Hence, the
restriction imposed on the manipulation decision by an unobservable bench-
mark that mB = mG must decrease the agent’s utility.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
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The principal’s problem can be stated in Lagrange form:
Max
wSG,wSB ,mG,mB
L = −((ph+γ)qwSG+(ph−γ)(1−q)wSB+(1−ph−γ)qmGwSG+
+ (1− ph + γ)(1− q)mBwSB) + λ(q((1−mG)wSG + gm
2
G
2
)+
+(1−q)((1−mB)wSB+ gm
2
B
2
)− c
(ph − pl))+µ(wSB−gmB)+ν(wSG−gmG).
(A.21)
Proof of part (i)
Assume that the solution will be wSB > 0 and wSG = 0.
Using this, (A.16), and (A.14), I get
2(1−mB)gmB + gm2B =
2c
(1− q)(ph − pl) and (A.22)
wSB = (g −
√
g
(1− q)(ph − pl) (g(1− q)(ph − pl)− 2c)). (A.23)
These equations can be used to solve for the Lagrangian multipliers.
Importantly,
λ =
(ph − γ)g + 2(1− ph + γ)wSB
g − wSB and ν = 0. (A.24)
Then, one has to check whether dL
dwSG
< 0 is indeed satisfied:
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λ+ v < ph + γ reduces after some algebra to
g > g∗ ≡ 2c
(1− q)(ph − pl)(1− b2) , (A.25)
where b = 1− 2γ
2− ph + 3γ < 1, (A.26)
thus proving part (i) of Proposition 1.4.
Proof of parts (ii), (iii), and (iv).
Assume that the solution will be wSB = wSG = w.
Using simplified notation (mB = mG = m), I get the following results:
w = gm, (A.27)
m = 1−
√
1− 2c
g(ph − pl) (A.28)
Again, one has to check whether dL
dwSG
= dL
dwSB
= 0 is indeed satisfied.
The four Lagrangian derivatives are
dL
dwSB
= − (1− q) (mB(1− ph + γ) + ph − γ) + λ (1−mB) (1− q) + µ = 0,
(A.29)
dL
dwSG
= −q (mG(1− ph − γ) + ph + γ) + λq (1−mG) + v = 0, (A.30)
dL
dmB
= −wSB (1− q) (1− ph + γ)−λ (wSB − gmB) (1− q)− gµ = 0, (A.31)
dL
dmG
= −qwG (1− ph − γ)− qλ (wG − gmG)− gν = 0. (A.32)
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Solving for the Lagrangian multipliers ν and µ reduces the system to
two equations:
mB(1−ph+γ)+ph−γ−λ (1−mB) = (−wSB (1− ph + γ)−λ (wSB − gmB))1
g
,
(A.33)
mG(1−ph−γ) +ph+γ−λ (1−mG) = (−wG (1− ph − γ)−λ (wG − gmG))1
g
.
(A.34)
Plugging the above expressions for wage and manipulation in, solving
for λ, reducing the system to one equation, yields the following results:
m =
1
2
, (A.35)
g = ĝ ≡ 8c
3(ph − pl) , (A.36)
proving part (iii) of Proposition 1.4.
Additionally, one can show that for g > ĝ, it is the case that with
benchmark-independent compensation, dL
dwSB
> 0, and dL
dwSG
< 0. And if g < ĝ,
then vice versa. This shows that for g > ĝ, RPE is optimal, while for g < ĝ,
JPE is optimal, proving parts (ii) and (iv) of Proposition 1.4. The proof
can also be obtained by invoking the intermediate value theorem, because the
functions are continuous.
Proof of part (v):
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For this proof, I will show that when g ≡ 2c
ph−pl , the only (asymptoti-
cally) feasible compensation structure is IPE.
Assume that the (only feasible) solution is wSG = wSB = g =
2c
ph−pl .
Plugging these values into equation (A.17) shows that this contract
satisfies the incentive constraint with equality.
Plugging the above values into equations (A.14) and (A.15) yields mB =
mG = 1. Due to the negative relationship between wSG and wSB, any deviation
from IPE would result in either the invalid mB > 1 or the invalid mG > 1,
proving part (v) of the proposition that IPE is the only feasible solution.
Proof of Corrolary 1.1
The use of RPE can by analyzed with the cutoff values ĝ and g∗. An
increase in g∗ means that RPE is used less because the range ”max RPE”
(part (v) in Proposition 4) gets smaller. An increase in ĝ means that RPE
is also used less because the range ”RPE” (part (iv) in Proposition 4) gets
smaller.
Take the above derived formula for g∗ :
g∗ ≡ 2c
(1− q)(ph − pl)(1− b2) , (A.37)
where b = 1− 2γ
2− ph + 3γ < 1. (A.38)
It is immediately clear that an increase in b causes an increase in g∗.
Thus, it is sufficient to take the derivative of b with respect to γ:
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db
dγ
= − 2(2− ph)
(3γ − ph + 2)2
< 0. (A.39)
ĝ is not affected by a change in γ, thus completing the proof of part (i).
We can do the same for ph :
db
dph
= − 2γ
(3γ − ph + 2)2
< 0. (A.40)
There is another ph term in the formula for g
∗, but the effect of a
change there has the same direction as the effect via b (that is, increasing
the denominator), and hence the inverse relationship holds. ĝ and ph are also
inversely related, thus completing the proof of part (ii).
The third part of the corollary can be shown directly:
dg∗
dc
=
2
(1− q)(ph − pl)(1− b2) > 0, (A.41)
An increase in c also causes ĝ to increase, thus the effect is again un-
ambiguous, completing the proof of part (iii) of Corrolary 1.1.
Proof of Corrolary 1.2
Plugging (A.14) and (A.15) into the IC constraint (A.16) gives the fol-
lowing constraint:
q((1−mG)gmG + gm
2
G
2
) + (1− q)((1−mB)gmB + gm
2
B
2
) =
c
(ph − pl) . (A.42)
Since this constraint must hold with equality, there must be an inverse
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relationship between m and g.
To show (ii), assume that the agent will, irrationally, ex-post, decide not
to manipulate. Proving that expected wage declines in this case, is sufficient
proof, because manipulation is declining in g as well. Thus, I want to show
that
E[w] = (ph − γ)(1− q)wSB + (ph + γ)qwSG (A.43)
is declining in g. Solving (A.17) for wSB and plugging it into (A.43)
expresses expected wage as a function of wSG alone.
E[w] = (ph−γ)(1− q)g
1−
√√√√ 1
1− q
(
1− 2c
g(ph − pl) − q
(
1− wSG
g
)2)
+ (ph + γ)qwSG (A.44)
Since dwSG
dg
< 0, it is sufficient to show that dE[w]
dwSG
< 0 to prove part (ii)
of the corrolary.
The proof of (iii) is explained in the text below the proposition. The
agent could keep her manipulation decision constant and simply enjoy a higher
rent. Any change in manipulation level must be to the benefit of the agent.
Proof of Corollary 1.3
Taking the derivative of (A.37) with respect to q yields
dg∗
dq
=
2c
(ph − pl) (1− b2) (1− q)2
> 0, (A.45)
proving the corollary (ĝ is unaffected by a change in q).
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Proof of Propostion 1.5
Let the renegotiated contract be wn = {wSGn, wSBn, wFGn, wFBn}. If
the principal has all the bargaining power, then he will offer a new contract
that makes the agent indifferent, if her project failed, and reject the new offer,
if she succeeded.
wSGn = wFGn = mGwSG+(1−mG)wFG− gm
2
G
2
=
w2SG
g
−w
2
SG
2g
=
w2SG
2g
, (A.46)
wSBn = wFBn = mBwSB+(1−mB)wFB− gm
2
B
2
=
w2SB
g
−w
2
SB
2g
=
w2SB
2g
. (A.47)
Thus, the new contract does not affect the effort incentive constraint.
The remainder of the proof proceeds similar to the proof of Proposition 4.
Max
wSG,wSB
L = −((ph + γ)qwSG + (ph − γ)(1− q)wSB + (1− ph − γ)qw
2
SG
2g
+
+(1−ph+γ)(1−q)w
2
SB
2g
)+λ(qwSG(1−wSG
2g
)+(1−q)wSB(1−wSB
2g
)− c
(ph − pl))
(A.48)
Assume that the optimal solution is wSG = 0 and wSB > 0.
dL
dwSG
= −ph − γ + λ < 0, (A.49)
dL
dwSB
=
1
g
(1− q) (λ (g − wB)− (wB − gγ + gph + γwB − wBph)) = 0.
(A.50)
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Using the agent’s incentive constraint yields
wSB = g
(
1−
√
1− 2c
g(1− q)(ph − pl)
)
. (A.51)
I need to check whether dL
dwSG
< 0 is indeed satisfied:
−1
g
q (wG + gγ + gph − γwG − wGph) + qλ
g
(g − wG) < 0, (A.52)
which, after plugging in (A.51) and some algebra, simplifies to
g >
2c
(1− q)(ph − pl)(1− (1−2γ)(1+2γ)
2
)
= g∗n, (A.53)
Comparing g∗ with g∗n shows that g
∗ > g∗n, proving the main part of
Proposition 5. The last sentence of the proposition can be shown by assuming
that wage payments are equal and examining the Lagrangian derivatives, which
yield that dL
dwSB
> 0, and dL
dwSG
< 0 for all values of g when a solution exists,
which shows that JPE is never optimal.
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1
When there are many analysts, they forecast zm while taking the ma-
nipulation range as given: [z′ −m, z′]
E[(zm − y)2] =
∫ z′−m
−∞
(zm − x)2f(x)dx+
∫ +∞
z′
(zm − x)2f(x)dx. (B.1)
Minimzing the above equation will occur when the derivative is zero:
d
dzm
E[(zm−y)2] =
∫ z′−m
−∞
2(zm−x)f(x)dx+
∫ +∞
z′
2(zm−x)f(x)dx = 0. (B.2)
When there is one analyst, he forecasts z and the manipulation range
changes when the forecast changes: [z −m, z].
E[(z − y)2] =
∫ z−m
−∞
(z − x)2f(x)dx+
∫ +∞
z
(z − x)2f(x)dx. (B.3)
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Again, minimizing this equation occurs when the derivative is zero. I
evaluate the derivate at z = zm.
d
dz
E[(z − y)2]|z=zm =
∫ z−m
−∞
2(zm − x)f(x)dx+
+
∫ +∞
z
2(zm − x)f(x)dx+m2f(zm −m) = m2f(zm −m) > 0. (B.4)
The first and second summand combined are equal to the derivative of
the forecast error when there are many analysts, and thus sum to zero, when
evaluated at z = zm.
Proof of Proposition 2.1 (completed)
The missing part of the proof is the first-order approximation.
F (z)− F (z −m)−mf(z −m) ≈= m[f(z − m
2
)− f(z −m)], (B.5)
which is greater than zero, if f ′(z) > 0. The first derivative of the
probability density function at the mean (or median) is positive, when the
Pearson mode skewness is negative.
Proof of Corollary 2.1
A mean-preserving spread means that f(x = E[x]) is decreasing. The
probability density function becomes flatter, thus values close to the mean
become less likely. Note that I assumed that m is small relative to the earnings
distribution, which implies that the forecast z is close to the mean. Taking
the derivative of (2.4) with respect to f(x), evaluated at x = E[x], proves the
first part of the corollary.
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The second part of the corollary immediately follows from the first part.
Proof of Corollary 2.2
When the distribution is unskewed, then the first derivative of the
distribution at the mean is zero: f ′(x = E[x]) = 0. Using this to ana-
lyze (B.5) shows that there is no effect of a change in the forecast on earn-
ings management, when the distribution is unskewed. As skewness increases,
abs[f(z − m
2
)− f(z −m)] increases as well, proving the corollary.
Proof of Corollary 2.3
Taking the derivative of (2.4) with respect to m immediately proves the
corollary.
Proof of Proposition 2(iii)
In an equilibrium, the manager cannot have an incentive to deviate.
This will be the case when he cannot improve upon the 50% success rate
he will have because analysts forecast the median. Due to the assumption
of constant shape parameters, it is the case that the nonparametric skew is
constant: S = µ−ν
σ
, where µ is the mean, ν is the median, and σ is the standard
deviation. Thus,
ν = µ− Sσ. (B.6)
The manager tries to maximize the median. Thus, I solve for the first
derivative with respect to k and examine it at k = kFB.
dν
dk
|k=kFB = (
dµ
dk
− Sdσ
dk
)|k=kFB = −S
dσ
dk
|k=kFB . (B.7)
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At the first-best investment level, the first derivative of the mean is
zero. The first derivative of the standard deviation is positive for all k. Thus,
if skewness is positive, then an increase in variance must lead to a decrease in
the median, and vice versa for negative skewness.
sign(
dν
dk
|k=kFB) = sign(−S) (B.8)
Proof of Proposition 2.3
The manager wants to maximize the probability that he surpasses the
target. Earnings management increases this probability by:
∫ E[x]
z−m
f(x)dx. (B.9)
Note that for values above the mean, earnings management does not
increase the success rate because without EM, the forecast would have been
equal to the mean (the proof works similarly if analysts minimize the absolute
error). More probability mass will be centered around the mean, when the
variance of the distribution is smaller. Thus, less investment increases equation
(B.9).
Proof of Proposition 2.4
The proof for a right-skewed distribution follows immediately from the
results obtained in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3. The proof for a left-skewed distri-
bution needs to show that for a large enough m, there will be underinvestment.
105
The manager wants to maximize his chances of meeting or beating the forecast:
max
∫ ∞
z−m
f(x)dx. (B.10)
If investment is unobservable, then he will take the forecast z as given
(and thus z −m as well). There exists m = mFB, such that z −mFB = E[x].
Intuitively, as m grows large, the analysts would not have a forecast error for
earnings that are above the mean (if they keep z −m above the mean), but
would still have one for realizations below the mean. Thus, at some point it
will be beneficial to the analysts, if the manipulation range extends below the
mean, because there is no benefit for them to increase z even further: lim
x→∞
f(x) = 0.
The manager wants to decrease the percentile at z − m (he wants to
maximize 1 minus the percentile at z −m). For constant shape parameters,
the percentile of the mean is constant. Thus, when z − m = E[x], then
the manager cannot increase his chances of success by deviating from first-
best. When z − m < E[x] (when m > mFB), then a decrease in variance
(i.e. underinvestment) causes the percentiles below the mean to approach the
mean. Hence, for a fixed value below the mean such as z −m, the percentile
will decrease.
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.2 (continued) and Comparative Statics
Some of the proof is in the main text above. This is a continuation
and supplement. An equilibrium must satisfy five equations: three investor-
related, (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), one good-firms-related, (3.9), and one bad-firms-
related, (3.10). One omitted equation is that the investors will break-even for
an equity issue, too. Since still only bad firms issue equity, ΨE is unchanged
from Proposition 1. Thus, three unknowns remain: ΨC , FC , and z. Since there
are only two equalities, but three inequalities, multiple equilibria are possible.
Recall that investors and bad firms are indifferent between these, and good
firms bear all the changes in profits. Thus, to simplify the analysis, I will
focus on the best possible equilibrium, when (3.7) is satisfied with equality
(i.e. z = z). If this equilibrium is not stable, then no mixed-strategy one is,
because (3.9) is easiest to satisfy in the equilibrium that is best for good firms.
This leaves three equalities and three unknowns, hence a solution must exist.
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Solving (3.10) for ΨC and plugging the solution into (3.8) yields an
equation for FC in terms of z:
FC = (I(v+z)+(vpLGθG−vpLG−zpLB+zpLBθB)XL−vpHGGE−zpHBBE+
+
vpHGGE + zpHBBE
pHB
− I vpHGGE + zpHBBE
pHBBE
+
vpHGGE + zpHBBE
pHBBE
(1− θB)C − vpHGGE + zpHBBE
pHBBE
pLBθBXH)
(vpLGθG + zpLBθB − vpHGGE + zpHBBE
pHBBE
pLBθB)
−1. (C.1)
Taking the derivative of the above equation with respect to z yields
dFC
dz
=
BEpBH (XLpBL −BE − C +BEpBH + CθB + θBXHpBL − θBXLpBL)
vθBGEpBLpGH − vθGBEpBHpGL .
(C.2)
This derivative is positive iff θGBEpBHpGL > θBGEpBLpGH , which can
be rearranged to show that it is satisfied if p is above a certain threshold,
proving Corollary 3.1(i). The left-hand side is decreasing in p (approaching
0 as p approaches 1) and the right-hand side is increasing in p. Hence, a
threshold p∗ must exist such that both sides are equal.
The proof of Corollary 3.1(ii) follows immediately from (3.10), rearrang-
ing in terms of ΨC and taking the derivative with respect to FC .
Returning to the main proof, (C.2) can be plugged into (3.7) to derive
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the following implicit function:
G(z) = (1− (BE − I − pLB(θB(XH − FC)− (1− θB)C)) 1
pHBBE
)
(σ2GE+(1−σ2)BE)−σ2(XL+θG(FC−XL))−(1−σ2)(XL+θB(FC−XL)) = 0.
(C.3)
Thus, the implicit function theorem can be applied to this equation:
dz
dc
= −dU
dc
(dU
dz
)−1.
The proof that z > 0 for p < 1 and c > 0 is done by contradiction.
Suppose that z = 0. Then σ1 = σ2 = 1, i.e. investors know that a firm issuing
convertibles is good and the signal will not change this belief. Thus, investors
will not use the signal and either always convert to equity or always stick with
debt. If the always convert, then bad firms could mirror good firms’ strategy
with no punishment. If they never convert, then convertibles serve no purpose
and could be substituted with long-term debt.
It remains to show that for p < 1 and c = 0, a perfectly separating
equilibrium can be sustained. In this case σ1 > σ2 = 0. This means that
after a convertibles issue and a subsequent off-equilibrium bad signal, investors
would know that the firm is bad and not convert to equity. Good firms will
never produce a bad signal and always achieve conversion, i.e. they have no
incentive to deviate. The last thing to check is that bad firms will not deviate.
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This condition can be expressed as follows:
XL+θB∆X−I ≥ (1−p)(1−ΨC)(XL+θB∆X)+p(θB(XH−FC)− (1−θB)C).
(C.4)
As long as C is sufficiently high enough, this condition will be met. A
high C does not affect good firms, who never suffer from financial distress.
This shows that for c = 0, we can achieve a perfectly separating equilibrium,
i.e. z = 0, and that for a conservative accounting system (c > 0), the number
of bad firms issuing convertibles, z, is higher. Proposition 3.3 uses this insight,
along with the expressions (3.11) and (3.12).
Proof of sequential financing theory extension
The manager has three investment opportunities and no funds as de-
scribed below.
Investment 1 is available at t = 0, needs investment K1, and has an
NPV of N1 > 0.
Investment 2 is available at t = 1, needs investment K2, and has an
NPV of N2 ∈ {x,−x}, which will be x with probability q.
Investment 3 is available at t = 1, needs investment K2, and has an
NPV of −x < −N3 < 0.
Issue cost for financing are and the manager is (exogenously assumed)
prone to overinvestment. To fund the investments, he can either issue short-
term debt, long-term debt, or convertible bonds. The manager learns the
project quality with certainty at t = 1, while the investors receive a signal
with the same structure as in the main model. Furthermore, suppose that the
110
signal is meaningful, i.e. after a low signal investors prefer no investment, after
a high signal investors do.
Profit from raising long-term debt: N1 + qx− (1− q)N3 − C.
Profit from raising short-term debt: N1−C + q(1− (1− p)c)(x−C)−
(1− q)(1− p)(1− c)N3
Profit from raising convertibles: N1−C+ q(1− (1− p)c)x− (1− q)(1−
p)(1− c)N3
First note that convertibles always dominate short-term debt in this
model. So we just need to compare the remaining two options.
After some algebra, onvertibles dominate long-term debt if
qx(1− p)c < (1− (1− p)(1− c))(1− q)N3, (C.5)
which can be rearranged to
c(qx− (1− q)N3)(1− p) < p(1− q)N3. (C.6)
If (qx− (1− q)N3) is negative, then convertibles dominate regardless of
the accounting system. If this factor is positive, then convertibles dominate if
conservatism is below a certain threshold.
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